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 ABSTRACT 
Recent scientific developments in areas such as biotechnology and biomedicine have led to a 
revolution in the field of biomedical enhancement and to the emergence of innovative and 
revolutionary possibilities of human enhancement. Biomedical scientists have been able to discover 
ways in which human beings could not only be enhanced in terms of their physiological make up, 
but also possibly with regard to their moral convictions and inclinations. Several advocates of this 
new possibility, referred to as biomedical moral enhancement, have maintained that biomedical 
moral enhancement could alter the current generally irresponsible and self-centred practices of 
people throughout the world today, create a sustainable future for forthcoming generations and the 
planet and make people morally better. Other scholars, on the other hand, have pointed out that the 
possibility of biomedical moral enhancement raises a number of important philosophical questions 
that require us to explore, understand and critically evaluate the practice as well as its possible 
implications. This study focuses on two of those important questions raised by the possibility of 
interventions of biomedical moral enhancement. The first question has to do with the nature and 
content of the norms in terms of which moral enhancements could be measured. The second, even 
more pertinent, issue is the question as to whether morality or a true moral disposition can be 
reconciled with the social determination that seems to inevitably follow from moral enhancement 
projects. In other words, does the fact of being morally better come at the cost of the exercise of 
individuals’ freedom? Will people be morally better just because they have been “programmed” or 
“determined” to be so? And if this is the case, how can a true moral disposition, which seemingly 
inevitably involves the agent’s freedom to choose the less moral choice or behaviour, be reconciled 
with the social determinism that seems to inevitably follow from interventions of moral 
enhancement?  In the attempt to find an answer to the question raised above, this study investigates 
whether interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would curtail individuals’ freedom and, if 
this is the case, whether this might affect individuals’ ability to behave morally. This study is going 
to argue that a specific type of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, namely behaviour-
oriented interventions might pose a threat to individuals’ freedom to fall and to conclude that, 
although interventions of biomedical moral enhancement might make people behave so as to bring 
about the morally desirable outcome, they will fail to make people morally better and also make the 
very notion of morality meaningless and worthless. This is because the curtailment of the freedom 
to fall, i.e. to behave immorally, also involves the curtailment of the freedom to stand, i.e. to behave 
morally.  
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 OPSOMMING 
Onlangse wetenskaplike ontwikkeling op die gebied van biotegnologie en biogeneeskunde het 
gelei tot ŉ revolusie in die veld van biomediese verbetering, en tot die verskyning van vernuwende 
en revolusionêre moontlikhede vir menslike verbetering. Biomediese wetenskaplikes kon maniere 
ontdek waarop mense nie slegs ten opsigte van hulle fisiologiese samestelling verbeter kon word 
nie, maar ook ten opsigte van hulle morele oortuigings en neigings. Verskeie voorstanders van 
hierdie nuwe moontlikheid, waarna verwys word as biomediese morele verbetering, redeneer dat 
biomediese morele verbetering die huidige algemeen onverantwoordelike en selfgesentreerde 
praktyke van mense regoor die wêreld kan wysig, ŉ volhoubare toekoms vir toekomstige generasies 
en die planeet kan skep, en mense moreel verbeter. Ander geleerdes, daarenteen, het uitgewys dat 
die moontlikheid van biomediese morele verbetering ŉ aantal belangrike filosofiese vrae opper, wat 
van ons vereis om die praktyk, asook die moontlike implikasies daarvan, te verken, te begryp en 
krities te evalueer. Hierdie studie fokus op twee van daardie belangrike vrae wat deur die 
moontlikheid van ingrypings van biomediese morele verbetering geopper word. Die eerste vraag 
handel oor die aard en inhoud van die norme ingevolge waarvan morele verbetering gemeet kan 
word. Die tweede, selfs meer relevante kwessie, is die vraag oor of moraliteit, of ŉ ware morele 
ingesteldheid, versoen kan word met die sosiale beskikking wat oënskynlik onvermydelik uit 
projekte van morele verbetering volg. Met ander woorde, kom die feit van moreel beter wees ten 
koste van die uitoefening van individue se vryheid? Sal mense moreel beter wees net omdat hulle 
geprogrammeer of beskik is om so te wees? En as dit die geval is, hoe kan ŉ ware morele 
ingesteldheid, wat op die oog af die agent se vryheid behels om die minder morele opsie of gedrag 
te kies, versoen word met die sosiale determinisme, wat skynbaar onvermydelik uit ingrypings van 
morele verbeterings volg?  In ŉ poging om ŉ antwoord op bogenoemde vraag te vind, ondersoek 
hierdie studie of ingrypings van biomediese morele verbetering individue se vryheid inperk en, as 
dit die geval is, of dit individue se vermoë om moreel op te tree, beïnvloed. Hierdie studie sal 
aanvoer dat ŉ spesifieke soort ingryping van biomediese morele verbetering, naamlik 
gedragsgeoriënteerde ingrypings, ŉ bedreiging vir individue se vryheid om te val inhou en tot die 
slotsom kom dat, hoewel ingrypings van biomediese morele verbetering mense laat optree op ŉ 
wyse wat die moreel-gewenste uitkoms daarstel, dit nie daarin slaag om mense moreel beter te 
maak nie, en die hele konsep van moraliteit betekenisloos en waardeloos maak. Dit is omdat die 
inperking van die vryheid om te val, d.w.s. om immoreel op te tree, ook die inperking van die 
vryheid om te staan, d.w.s. om moreel op te tree, behels.  
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““But I don’t want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I 
want goodness. I want sin.” “In fact,” said Mustapha Mond, “you’re claiming the right to be 
unhappy.” “All right then,” said the Savage defiantly, “I’m claiming the right to be unhappy”” 
(Huxley, 1932: 230). 
 
One of the most revolutionary possible implications of the recent genetic revolution in 
biomedicine is the prospect of enhancing human beings morally, i.e. improving human moral 
inclinations and choices, thereby assuring that a social and environmental dispensation ensues that 
would be much more beneficial to mankind and the planet than is what foreseen if current 
irresponsible and self-centred practices continue. This prospect, generally referred to as biomedical 
moral enhancement, has quickly become one of the most controversial topics in contemporary 
biomedical and bioethical literature. The topicality of the possibility of biomedical moral 
enhancement is not surprising. Biomedical moral enhancement could have far reaching implications 
for humankind and the planet, it could change, for the better or for the worse, the very essence of 
human beings. 
Think of what could happen if people could, via genetic manipulation, be enhanced to be less 
prone to violence, more honest in business dealings (or when exercising political leadership) or less 
selfish in insisting on transport modes that, through the burning of fossil-fuels, threaten to 
prematurely consume acceptable oxygen levels in the atmosphere. Will the world then be a better 
place? Will human beings finally be able to alleviate human suffering and to solve environmental 
catastrophes? 
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The idea that people could be morally enhanced is far from representing an innovative 
phenomenon. Moral enhancement, as a particular instance of human enhancement, represents a 
constant variable of human history. Education and socialisation, for instance, have long been used 
in the attempt to morally enhance individuals. In addition, practical improvement of morality has 
also been sought through theories about distributive justice and experiments with social policies that 
would insist on virtuous behaviour. However, as Bertrand Russell (1924:59-61) wrote: 
“If men were rational in their conduct, that is to say, if they acted in the way most likely to bring 
about the ends that they deliberately desire, intelligence would be enough to make the world almost a 
paradise. In the main, what is in the long run advantageous to one man is also advantageous to 
another. But men are actuated by passions which distort their view; feeling an impulse to injure 
others, they persuade themselves that it is to their interest to do so. They will not, therefore, act in the 
way that is in fact to their own interest unless they are actuated by generous impulses which make 
them indifferent to their own interest. This is why the heart is as important as the head. By the 
“heart” I mean, for the moment, the sum-total of kindly impulses. Where they exist, science helps 
them to be effective; where they are absent, science only makes men more cleverly diabolic. [..] 
Our unconscious is more malevolent than it pays us to be; therefore, the people who do most 
completely what is in fact in their interest are those who, on moral grounds, do what they believe to 
be against their interest. 
For this reason, it is of the greatest importance to inquire whether any method of strengthening 
kindly impulses exists. I have no doubt that their strength or weakness depends upon discoverable 
physiological causes”. 
 It has only been recently that rapid advances in our understanding of the workings of the human 
body and mind have turned the prospect of the biomedical alteration of human beings and the 
possibility of making them morally better from the realm of speculation to reality. The current 
literature on the topic reports a variety of different positions. Several philosophers and bioethicists, 
such as Thomas Douglas (2008, 2013, 2014) and Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2008, 2010, 
2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2017), have shown support for the possibility of biomedical moral 
enhancement. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2012a) even define biomedical moral 
enhancement as an urgent necessity and they argue that it represents the last hope human beings 
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have if they wish to avert current environmental catastrophes, such as climate change, human 
suffering and the very extinction of the human species itself. They argue (2012a) that the current 
existential threats of climate change and terrorism cannot be avoided if human beings do not firstly 
overcome their, biologically and genetically based, moral limitations and deficiencies. Moreover, in 
the absence of effective moral enhancements, scientific progress would exacerbate the current 
situations causing enormous amounts of harm all over the world (Persson & Savulescu, 2012b). 
Other philosophers, such as John Harris (2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2016) and John Shook (2012), 
have raised more concern about the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement. They claim that 
the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement raises a number of important philosophical 
questions. John Harris (2011), for instance, argues that moral enhancement could not only 
significantly curtail individuals’ freedom but could also impact upon the common understanding of 
morality, making the very notion of morality itself meaningless and worthless. The important 
philosophical questions raised by the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement require us to 
explore, understand and critically evaluate the possibility of such a practice as well as what its 
possible implications could be.   
In this thesis, I will specifically focus on two of the important philosophical questions raised by 
the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement. The first question has to do with the nature and 
content of the norms in terms of which moral enhancements could be measured. If we insist on the 
creation/construction of “better” people and are indeed able to “improve” the moral disposition of 
human beings, according to whose and which standards is that to be determined? How could such 
decisions be made? To assert that moral enhancement would create morally better people and 
enhance human moral capabilities, is to make a normative claim. In order to evaluate a normative 
claim, two conditions are required. The first condition is the identification of the specific 
capabilities, dispositions or traits that should represent the target of interventions of biomedical 
moral enhancement. The second condition is the identification of clear and adequate standards or 
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criteria of evaluation in terms of which the potential moral enhancement might be assessed. In the 
absence of such criteria it would be impossible to determine whether biomedical moral 
enhancement could successfully achieve proper moral enhancement and make people morally 
better.  
The second, even more pertinent, issue is the question as to whether morality or a true moral 
disposition can be reconciled with the social determination that seems to inevitably follow from 
moral enhancement projects. Leaving on the side, for a moment, the issue of evaluation and the fact 
that biomedical moral enhancement only represents a possibility, a more significant question 
emerges. Suppose there are criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement and suppose that 
biomedical enhancement is not a possibility but an actual practice commonly employed. Suppose, 
furthermore, that the practice is successful and that it actually makes people morally better. Does 
the fact of being morally better come at the cost of the exercise of individuals’ freedom? Will 
people be morally better just because they have been seemingly programmed or determined to be 
so? Furthermore if this is the case, how can a true moral disposition, which seemingly inevitably 
involves the agent’s freedom to choose the less moral choice or behaviour, be reconciled with the 
social determinism that seems to inevitably follow from interventions of moral enhancement? Can 
true freedom survive a practice where people may make choices that ensure less suffering (for 
humans, animals and plants) on earth, but have or remain with little choice in the matter? Is human 
freedom not fundamentally compromised by any effort to pre-determine the choices that people can 
make? In short, what happens to the nature and practice of morality in a situation where moral 
choice – which seemingly involves the possibility of making “wrong” choices (i.e. choices that may 
continue to have negative effects on the issues mentioned earlier) – is either terminated or 
significantly curtailed?  
Before delving into the depth of the arguments, it is necessary to firstly clarify the problematic 
notion of biomedical moral enhancement and to provide the reader with a general overview of the 
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topic. In the first chapter, I will define and clarify the notion of biomedical moral enhancement and 
distinguish it from other related concepts such as human enhancement and moral enhancement, 
biomedical enhancement and therapy. With regard to the definition of the notion of biomedical 
moral enhancement, as there is already some disagreement about the notion, my attempt will be to 
arrive at a minimum and general conception of moral enhancement. This is because there are still 
too many conceptual lacunae in the understanding of the subject as well as too much philosophical 
disagreement to make a more comprehensive conception of biomedical moral enhancement 
possible.   
Having clarified the ambiguous notion of biomedical moral enhancement, in the second chapter 
I am going to explore some of the main arguments and reasons that have been offered in support of 
the practice of biomedical moral enhancement. In particular, I will look at the challenging and 
persuasive argument developed by Persson and Savulescu. The aim of this chapter is to address two 
main questions. The first question is the one as to why human beings in fact need biomedical moral 
enhancement. The second question is the one as to what the advantages of biomedical moral 
enhancement are compared to other more traditional methods of moral enhancement. 
In the third chapter, I am going to focus on the first of the two previously mentioned issues 
posed by the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement, namely the assertion that interventions 
of biomedical moral enhancement would make individuals morally better. As I have argued, in 
order to evaluate this claim two conditions require to be satisfied, i.e. the identification of the 
specific capabilities, dispositions or traits that should represent the target of interventions of 
biomedical moral enhancement and the identification of clear and adequate standards for evaluation 
in terms of which the potential moral enhancement might be assessed. I will firstly attempt to 
identify what the target of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement should be. Secondly, I 
will attempt to identify what the possible criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement could be. 
More specifically, I will look at some possible relative and subjective criteria of evaluation and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 6 
identify the naturalist approach and the intercultural objectivism approach as frameworks that could 
enable the identification of objective criteria for the evaluation of interventions of biomedical moral 
enhancement.  
In the fourth chapter, I am going to focus on the second of the two previously mentioned issues 
raised by the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement, namely whether it could be possible to 
reconcile the curtailment of individuals’ freedom with the moral determinism that seems to 
inevitably follow from the practice of biomedical moral enhancement. This, however, requires us to 
firstly consider and critically assess whether interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would, 
actually, pose a threat to individuals’ freedom. In the attempt to find an answer to this issue, I will 
look at the argument developed by John Harris. According to Harris, interventions of biomedical 
moral enhancement would significantly curtail individuals’ freedom to fall, i.e. to commit morally 
deplorable acts; and thus, their very ability not only to behave immorally but also to behave morally 
because they will curtail individuals’ ability to commit moral errors. Is this really the case? Does 
biomedical moral enhancement threaten our freedom to fall? Having critically considered and 
assessed whether interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would, actually, pose a threat to 
individuals’ freedom, I will explore how the curtailment of individuals’ freedom would affect 
morality and moral agency. In other terms, if interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would 
result in the curtailment of individuals’ freedom, how would the loss of the freedom to fall impact 
upon our sense of morality? Could true morality still be possible in the absence of the freedom to 
fall? What would the possible implications of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement be? 
In the conclusion, I am going to summarise the main findings of the study and to draw to make 
some final remarks. More specifically, I will argue that even if it could be possible to identify 
normative criteria for the evaluation of biomedical moral enhancement, the practice would severely 
undermine human moral freedom. Several advocates of the possibility of biomedical moral 
enhancement, such as Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, argue that the curtailment of 
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individuals’ freedom to fall would be justified by their moral improvement. However, I personally 
think that it would rather represent a significant loss. Moreover, I will argue that the loss of the 
freedom to fall undermines the whole project of biomedical moral enhancement by making the very 
concept of moral enhancement meaningless. This is because, I am going to argue, if biomedical 
moral enhancement would alter an individual’s moral dispositions so that it would become 
impossible for them to behave in a morally wrong manner, it would also make it impossible for 
individuals to behave in the morally right manner. 
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Chapter One: Preliminary Clarifications  
The enhancement of human traits and capabilities does not represent an innovative phenomenon 
and it has received academic attention for decades. More recently, a new possibility, referred to as 
biomedical moral enhancement, has sparked much interest in the worlds of biomedicine and 
bioethics. The possibility of biomedical moral enhancement has, in fact, quickly become one of the 
most debated and controversial topics in the current literature. The topicality of the possibility of 
biomedical moral enhancement is not surprising; it could change, for better or for worse, the very 
nature of human beings. However, despite its topicality, the notion of biomedical moral 
enhancement remains ambiguous and unclear. The current literature on the topic is characterised by 
disagreement on almost every aspect concerning the very notion, including the very definition of 
biomedical moral enhancement. Most of the disagreement stems from the fact that any 
consideration, evaluation and conceptualisation of biomedical moral enhancement is grounded in 
the acceptance of different moral perspectives and theories and, consequentially, on different 
conceptions of what it means to act morally and on what would constitute proper moral 
enhancement.  
The existence of such an overall disagreement makes it difficult not only to offer a broad 
overview on the topic and on the current debates, but also to provide a definition of the notion of 
biomedical moral enhancement. However, a general overview of the latter and a clarification of the 
notion of biomedical moral enhancement are required in order to make sense of the arguments 
developed in this thesis. 
The aim of this introductive chapter is to provide such general background, to clarify the notion 
of biomedical moral enhancement and to stipulate some preliminary definitions. Given the absence 
of an overall consensus on how the notion of biomedical moral enhancement should be defined, my 
aim is to define biomedical moral enhancement in its broadest terms.  
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Biomedical Moral Enhancement 
Different scholars have proposed and defended different definitions and conceptualisations of the 
notion of biomedical moral enhancement. This, as I have pointed out, is mostly due to the fact that 
different moral theories offer different interpretations of what the term morality refers to. As a 
result, the adjective “moral” is ambiguous and can be defined in several different ways. The 
adjective moral is generally assumed to refer to what is concerned with principles of right or wrong 
behaviour. However, what should be referred to as moral mostly depends on the specific moral 
theory or framework accepted by the specific thinker or scholar that uses the adjective moral. For a 
utilitarian, for instance, a type of conduct or action is not intrinsically right or wrong. A moral 
action is the one that produces the best overall consequences. On the other hand, for a subjectivist, 
right and wrong are subjectively determined by the feelings of an agent and a moral action is an 
action that the subject just happens to feel or to think is the right one.  
 As a result, the term biomedical moral enhancement is used in a variety of ways and often with 
different meanings. Furthermore, alternative definitions are grounded in different understandings of 
moral enhancement and thus identify different interventions as instances of biomedical moral 
enhancement. Some scholars, such as Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2012a), use the notion 
of moral enhancement to refer to interventions that increase the probabilities that an individual 
would act so as to bring about outcomes that are morally more desirable than otherwise. They 
maintain that interventions of moral enhancement should target individuals’ dispositions, attitudes 
and emotions and that successful moral enhancements would be achieved by any intervention that 
would make an individual more inclined to particular moral and pro-social dispositions, attitudes 
and emotions. Other scholars, such as John Harris (2011, 2016), understand moral enhancement as 
an improvement of an individual capacity for moral reflection and thus maintain that interventions 
of moral enhancement should target an individual’s rational and cognitive abilities and that 
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successful moral enhancement would be achieved by any intervention that would improve an 
individual’s cognitive capacities (Raus, Focquaert, Schermer, Specker & Sterckx, 2014).  
Given the complexities that characterise the topic, I decided to analyse the notion of biomedical 
moral enhancement by breaking the concept into three main elements, namely human enhancement, 
moral enhancement and biomedical enhancement and by looking at each of them separately. 
Human Enhancement 
To enhance means to elevate, to augment, to make better, and to improve the quality or the 
extent of something. The phrase human enhancement refers to the enhancement of some capacity, 
ability or characteristic that normal human beings ordinarily have, or, more radically, to produce 
new ones. Human enhancement is generally pursued by means of interventions – human actions of 
many kinds, and, depending on the type of ability that it aims to enhance, it can be divided into 
three different types. Those three different types are physical, cognitive and moral human 
enhancement. The aim of physical enhancement is to improve human physical capacities. Athletes’ 
use of drugs to increase their performance, for instance, represents an example of physical 
enhancement. On the other side, the aim of cognitive enhancement is to increase individuals’ 
normal cognitive capacities such as memory, attention and reasoning, while the aim of moral 
enhancement is to increase individuals’ moral capacities. Education for instance, has long been used 
to enhance individuals’ moral knowledge and thus their moral abilities (Buchanan, 2011: 4).  
Human enhancement, understood as the enhancement of different human traits such as physical 
and cognitive abilities or complex human behaviour such as morality, represents a constant variable 
in human history rather than an innovative phenomenon. The human effort for improvement and 
enhancement has, in fact, shaped human life as long as human beings have existed. As Albert 
Camus (1956: 11) claims: “man is the only creature that refuses to be what he is” and that 
constantly seeks new ways to improve and enhance himself, to become more than human, to 
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transform himself and to overcome his all too human frailties and limitations (Allhoff, 2010). 
Similarly, Jean-Paul Sartre (1948: 28) claims that: “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself”. 
In the attempt to elevate themselves and to improve their quality of life, human beings have 
successfully improved several of their physical, mental and emotional capabilities. Human beings 
have won control over fire and tools and they have forced a new – more favourable, world around 
them. By building shelters and raising animals and crops, human beings have enhanced their power 
over brute nature. Through education, culture, literacy and technology they have successfully 
improved their intellectual and cognitive abilities. Literacy and numeracy, in particular, represent 
some of the most striking examples of cognitive enhancement. Literacy and numeracy together 
have made possible the greatest cognitive enhancement to date: modern science. Computers and 
smart phones also represent instances of cognitive enhancement. They facilitate long-distance 
communication and give us rapid access to a vast amount of information (Buchanan, 2011: 8). 
Furthermore, several of the most significant revolutions in the history of humanity would not 
have been possible without some types of human enhancement. The invention of writing, for 
example, dramatically enhanced human beings’ cognitive abilities and led to important 
achievements such as the broadening of culture and information. The agrarian revolution, the 
emergence of cities and the improvements in transportation and communication technologies have 
all triggered processes that have, if not completely shaped, at least influenced, not only individuals’ 
lives but also human history and progress (ibid.). However, human beings do not only desire to 
change the world around them. Human beings also desire to change and improve themselves. As I 
have argued, one way in which human beings have attempted to make themselves better, is through 
moral enhancement. 
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Moral Enhancement 
Moral enhancement, as a particular instance of human enhancement, refers to any attempt to 
improve an individual’s ability to behave morally, his moral reasoning or some of his moral 
dispositions and capacities, such as the capacity for fairness or altruism, that are assumed to be 
conducive to moral behaviour. In other words, what is at issue in moral enhancement is not the 
improvement of some physical and/or cognitive capacities, but the improvement of the ways in 
which we act or reflect morally.  
As human enhancement, moral enhancement also does not represent an innovative and 
revolutionary phenomenon. Education and socialisation, among others, have long been used as 
means of moral enhancement. Human beings have attempted to morally enhance themselves since 
the very beginning of communal living. Moral enhancement has generally been pursued and 
achieved by means of traditional and indirect methods of enhancement such as education and 
socialisation. Those methods are generally referred to as indirect methods because they do not 
directly target or intervene in people’s moral dispositions. They target other human capabilities, 
such as cognitive abilities and their aim is to make people more reliably produce morally correct 
ideas, motives or behaviours without committing to the content of those ideas, motives and actions 
(Baltimore, 2015). Education, for instance, targets the subject’s ability to reason and to make 
reasonable judgements. As such, it has the potential to influence, indirectly, the subject’s ability to 
behave morally. However, education and socialisation do not represent the only methods that have 
been used to morally enhance human beings. As Christoph Bubliz (2016: 88) argues, social orders 
have always striven to morally enhance individuals’ behaviour in order to ensure social cooperation 
and security. Thus, not only education and socialisation, but also legal systems, religion and 
psychiatry, have been used as means of institutionalised arrangements to promote moral behaviour. 
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The notion of moral enhancement is, however, fraught with difficult theoretical and practical 
questions. This is mostly due to the fact there is no general agreement on how moral enhancement 
should be defined, nor on what the criteria for the evaluation of any moral enhancement should be. 
More recently, some philosophers, bioethicists and scientists, such as Ingmar Persson and Julian 
Savulescu, have begun to seriously consider the possibility of morally enhancing human beings 
using innovative biomedical technologies. This possibility has quickly become a major topic of 
discussion in the current bioethical literature. Before looking at what the phrase biomedical moral 
enhancement refers to, it is important to shed some light on the notion of biomedical enhancement 
in general, as well as on the distinction between enhancement and therapy. 
Biomedical Enhancement 
As I have argued above, the enhancement of human traits represents a constant variable of 
human history and it is far from being an innovative and revolutionary phenomenon. Biomedical 
enhancement, on the other side, represents a recent phenomenon. The notion of human 
enhancement refers to interventions, intended as human actions, that improve some capacity or 
characteristic that normal human beings ordinarily have, or more radically, that create a new one. 
The notion of biomedical enhancement, on the other hand, refers to “interventions that make use of 
biotechnology to cause an improvement of an existing capacity by acting directly on the body or on 
the brain” (Buchanan, 2011: 5). The phrase biomedical enhancement is thus used to refer to those 
interventions that, by means of pharmaceutical, surgical or genetic techniques, make biological 
changes in human bodies and brains. The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics (2017) defines 
biomedical enhancement as “the practice of employing biomedical technologies, such as drugs and 
surgical techniques to combat diseases and to augment the capacities of normal and healthy 
individuals”. Interventions of cosmetic surgery, athletes’ use of steroid to improve their endurance 
and performance, the prescription of psychopharmacon to increase memory, elevate mood or 
improve cognitive capacities all represent instances of biomedical enhancement. In addition, also 
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factual or hypothetical genetic or neurological manipulation to increase the human lifespan, to 
acquire new sensory abilities or to develop a more social and moral character also represent 
instances of biomedical enhancements. 
Biomedical enhancements can be analysed in two ways: according to the type of capacity they 
aim to improve and according to the mode of intervention they use to improve the capacity. The 
types of capacities that biomedical enhancements can improve include cognitive function, physical 
strength, speed and stamina, mood, temperament, emotional functioning and longevity (Buchanan, 
2011: 5). The modes of biomedical enhancements include drugs, selecting which embryos to 
implant in the uterus, implanting genetically altered tissue into the body or the brain and 
technologies that connect computers directly to the brain (ibid.: 6). In many cases those 
interventions offer the possibility to restore human abilities and to prevent human suffering, to 
increase productivity and creativity, to make our life longer and our bodies and our minds stronger 
(Allhoff, 2010). Much potential progress in medicine, for instance, is the result of biomedicine. It is 
only thanks to progresses in biomedicine that, for the first time in history, human beings can cure or 
prevent –especially through vaccines- diseases that would have been fatal some decades ago.  
It is important to note that the line between biomedical and other types of enhancements is often 
very blurry. Consider the case of caffeine. Caffeine is a drug that can heighten alertness but, at the 
same time, coffee intake constitutes a social practice outside the biomedical sphere. Furthermore, 
one should carefully distinguish between treatment and enhancement. What distinguishes 
biomedical enhancement from the mere restoration of human functions? What is the line between 
treatment and enhancement?  
Enhancement and Treatment 
In several cases the terms enhancement and therapy are used interchangeably as if they refer to 
the same thing. However, as Nicholas Agar (2013) points out, this is not always the case. In the 
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current philosophical and bioethical literature on the topic there are two broad approaches to 
defining biomedical enhancement. The first approach does not distinguish between enhancement 
and therapy, it identifies enhancement with improvement and defines human enhancement as “any 
deliberative intervention that aims to improve an existing capacity, select for a desired capacity, or 
create a new capacity in a human being” (Buchanan, 2011: 23).  Allen Buchanan (ibid.), for 
instance, defines biomedical enhancement as “any instance of deliberative intervention which 
makes use of biomedical science and directly intervenes on the human brain or body and whose aim 
is either to improve an existing human capacity or to create a new one” (ibid.). This approach 
allows for the inclusion, in the denotation of the concept of biomedical enhancement, of medical as 
well as of non-medical interventions that are aimed at restoring the normal functioning of some 
human beings’ capabilities, such as treating or curing diseases and distortions. 
An alternative approach relativizes enhancement to human norms and distinguishes between 
improvements up to levels of functioning generally considered normal for humans, which are 
identified as mere therapy, and improvements beyond normal levels of functioning that are 
identified as identified as enhancements (Agar, 2013). Ryan Darby and Alvaro Pascual-Leone 
(2017), for instance, argue that therapy only refers to specific treatment for disorders and 
deficiencies which aims to restore the health of an individual. They argue that the distinction 
between treatment or therapy and enhancement is an important distinction and they have maintained 
that enhancements are interventions beyond therapy that increase capacities beyond normal levels 
rather than treat deviancies due to diseases (ibid.). 
An exhaustive analysis of the relation between therapy and enhancement will be beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it is important to point out that such a distinction is particularly hard 
to articulate for three reasons. Firstly, therapy and enhancement are not mutually exclusive. 
Secondly, the activity involved in both practices is often the same. Thirdly, it is very hard to define 
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the standards of health and improvement against which the difference between therapy and 
enhancement should be measured (Council of Bioethics, 2002).  
Biomedical Moral Enhancement 
This thesis is concerned with a particular type of biomedical enhancement or, better, with the 
possibility of a particular type of biomedical enhancement, namely biomedical moral enhancement. 
Biomedical moral enhancement represents an innovative possibility1. Recently, some philosophers, 
bioethicists and scientists, such as Persson and Savulescu (2012a), Douglas (2008), Buchanan 
(2011) and DeGrazia (2014), have begun to seriously consider the possibility of employing 
biomedical means to morally enhance human beings. They argue that by directly intervening on 
individuals’ brains to influence moral capabilities, it might be possible to increase the probability 
that these individuals will act in a more morally desirable manner. However, it is important to note 
that biomedical moral enhancement, at the moment, is still a possibility rather than a reality.   
 Although the debate is of recent date, biomedical moral enhancement has already become an 
established concept. Nevertheless, the notion is ambiguous. Scholars disagree on how the terms 
should be defined. Different scholars have proposed and defended different definitions. As John 
Shook (2012: 3) claims:  
“Too many discussions are proceeding as if both the meaning and the possibility of moral 
enhancement were already widely understood and agreed upon. […] Asking such questions, and 
offering answers, depend on assigning some sense or another to “moral enhancement.” However, 
clear and precise definitions of “moral enhancement” are not to be found; what has been called 
“moral” enhancement ranges from feeling empathic concern to increasing personal responsibility 
all the way to heightening respect for global fairness”.  
                                                
1 The idea of using biomedical interventions to improve moral behaviour is not completely new. In the late 60s’ 
Josè Delgado, an early pioneer in brain stimulation, argued that progress toward a better society would require the use 
of both educational and biomedical interventions to improve moral motivations and reduce tendencies toward violence 
(Delgado, 1969). Furthermore, many modern ethicists’ concerns for the amount of harm that progresses in science and 
technology could cause in the absence of an adequate moral status (Persson & Savulescu, 2012) seem to evoke 
Delgado’s concerns for unrestrained advances in “technologies of destruction” (Delgado, 1969) without parallel 
advances in moral behaviour. 
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Thomas Douglas (2011: 3), focuses on moral motives and defines moral enhancement as: 
“interventions that will expectably leave an individual with more moral motives or behaviour than 
she would otherwise have had”. David DeGrazia (2014: 1), on the other hand, focuses on moral 
capacities and emotions and defines biomedical moral enhancement as: “interventions that are 
intended to improve our moral capacities such as our capacities for sympathy and fairness”. 
Finally, Persson and Savulescu (2012a) focus on behaviour and understand biomedical moral 
enhancement as interventions that, through biomedical means, alter peoples’ moral psychology in 
order to make people more disposed to do the right thing or, at least, less disposed to do bad things.  
Despite the existence of this overall disagreement, it is possible to state that the term biomedical 
moral enhancement, in its broadest sense, refers to the potential practice of manipulating 
individuals’ moral behaviour by biological means in the attempt to make them morally better, i.e. to 
improve individuals’ conduct or moral psychology.  
As I have argued, moral enhancement does not represent a new phenomenon but it is actually as old 
as human communal living itself. However, biomedical moral enhancement does represent an 
innovative project. While the whole history of human communal living is full of attempts to 
promote, defend and enhance morality in order to benefit the community, these attempts were 
restricted to community enforcement through education, sanctions, moral codes and societal mores. 
What distinguishes the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement and makes of it a completely 
new phenomenon is that its aim is to achieve improvements in human moral capabilities by directly 
intervening on the human body or brain. Examples of biomedical methods of possible moral 
enhancement include the administration of drugs, such as serotonin reuptake inhibitors as a means 
to make individuals less inclined to assault other individuals, deep-brain stimulation as a way to 
reduce aggression, neurofeedback to increase sympathy and genetic interventions to gametes, 
embryos or postnatal human beings (DeGrazia, 2014: 2).  
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Most interventions of biomedical moral enhancement are instances of behaviour-oriented 
interventions, i.e. their aim is to alter individuals’ behaviour. Depending on the strategy in which 
they attempt to make individuals morally better, i.e. to make it more probable that individuals 
would act or behave in a morally desirable manner, biomedical moral enhancement can be divided 
into, at least, three different types. These types are emotional, dispositional and cognitive 
enhancement.  
Emotional and dispositional enhancements include interventions that attempt to morally 
enhance individuals either by altering an individual’s emotions or dispositions (Jebari, 2014). 
Douglas (2008: 229), for instance, as I have pointed out, defines moral enhancement as any 
intervention that improves a person’s moral motives: “A person morally enhances herself if she 
alters herself in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in her having morally better future 
motives, taken in sum, than she would otherwise have had” and thus identifies the alteration of an 
individuals’ dispositions as the proper target of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement. 
Douglas (ibid.) himself admits that the estimation of the motives that require to be enhanced might 
most probably depend on prevailing normative parameters rather than on objective standards. He 
recognizes that the formula does not make it immediately clear what sorts of psychological changes 
would count as moral enhancement. This lack of clarity, he argues, has two main reasons. The first 
one is that there is little agreement on which motives are morally good and to what degree. This 
disagreement cannot be solved by appealing to some view about what sorts of consideration 
determine the moral goodness of a motive because here there is even less agreement. The second 
reason is that different people would have different ideas about what should count as a good motive 
and what should count as an improvement in one’s motives (ibid.). Moreover, what counts as a 
good motive and what counts as an improvement also depends on the role performed by an 
individual. Legal reasoning might be desirable for a judge while, love might be more appropriate 
for a parent (ibid.: 4). However, he maintains that there is a wide range of emotions whose 
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reduction in the degree to which an agent experiences those emotions would constitute moral 
enhancement. This is because, Douglas argues, the attenuation of those emotions, such as racial 
bias, would most probably leave the individual with better moral motives overall.  
Persson and Savulescu (2012a) also maintain that the aim of biomedical moral enhancement is 
the alteration of individuals’ moral dispositions as a means to improve those moral sentiments and 
traits which are universally regarded as morally desirable and that are conducive to more moral 
behaviour. They argue that the aim of biomedical moral enhancement is to make individuals more 
likely to act morally by enhancing one or more of those individuals’ traits that are generally 
regarded as conducive to morally desirable attitudes such as altruism, and a sense of justice and 
fairness. In other words, according to Persson and Savulescu (2008: 168 – 169), biomedical moral 
enhancement is the enhancement of individuals’ disposition of altruism and their sense of justice 
and fairness. This means that biomedical moral enhancement requires the enhancement of 
individuals’ moral sensitivity.  Furthermore, the authors also propose some possible candidate 
moral enhancers.  They argue that research has confirmed that dispositions of moral relevance have 
a neurophysiological basis and that evidence has shown that some neuro-transmitters, such as 
oxytocin, have been proven to influence morally relevant attitudes such as trust and sympathy 
(Baccarini, 2014: 1027). Their argument rests partially on the scientific research conducted by 
Molly Crockett et al.2  
The enhancement of individuals’ cognitive abilities has also been identified as possible strategy 
of moral enhancement. This is because enhancing an individual’s cognitive abilities and capacities, 
                                                
2 Molly Crockett et al. conducted scientific research on the effects of serotonin, a neurotransmitter widely known 
for its role in the cure of depression, on moral behaviour and judgment.  The aim of the research was to study the 
willingness of test-subjects to harm others by responses to variants of the well-known “trolley Dilemma”. The study 
reported that “serotonin directly modifies subjects’ moral judgements and behaviours by means of enhancing aversion 
to personally harm others “(Crockett et al., 2010: 17433). This has led the researchers to conclude that individuals 
under the effects of elevated serotonin are less likely to inflict harm to other people (ibid.). It is important to note that 
these possibilities for moral improvement by means of biomedical means do not assume biological determinism. The 
idea is not to create moral virtue pills or to implant an empathy tissue in individuals’ brains. The idea is that, to the 
extent that moral virtues or dispositions have a biological base, it might become possible to improve or enhance them 
by intervening on human biology. 
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improves an individual’s internal or external information processing systems and thus his ability to 
behave morally. In contrast to traditional methods of cognitive enhancement, such as education, that 
indirectly target moral capacities, interventions of biomedical moral enhancement attempt to 
morally enhance individuals by directly targeting cognitive functions through the administration of 
nootropics, i.e. drugs, supplements, or other substances that improve cognitive functions such as 
memory, creativity, or motivation. For instance, the prescription of memory-improving drugs which 
would help to increase human beings’ truthfulness and thus, possibly, make people morally better. 
Furthermore, psychological studies have suggested that human beings tend to make specific 
cognitive errors and that some of those cognitive errors can contribute to patterns of behaviour that 
are traditionally called vices, such as the human tendency to attribute other people’s behaviour to 
their personalities without taking into consideration other factors of possible influence such as the 
environment (Buchanan, 2011: 169). 
This brief exposition has shown that, despite the existence of a general disagreement on the 
specific meaning of the term moral enhancement, supporters of the possibility of biomedical moral 
enhancement tend to agree that biological or genetic interventions might make individuals morally 
better by increasing the probability that they would act so as to bring about morally desirable 
outcomes and thus make people morally better. 
As I am going to argue below, both those two claims require to be evaluated in terms of specific 
criteria or standards of evaluation. However, before turning on the conceptual and practical issues 
posed by the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement, it is worthwhile to look at some of the 
key claims that proponents of biomedical moral enhancement have made and on which they have 
based their arguments in favour of the need for biomedical moral enhancement. In other words, why 
do we need biomedical moral enhancement? What advantages can the practice offer compared to 
traditional methods of moral enhancement? 
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Chapter Two: The Case for Biomedical Moral Enhancement 
Advocates of biomedical moral enhancement, such as Thomas Douglas (2008), Ingmar Persson 
and Julian Savulescu (2012a), argue that there is an urgent need to pursue research into the 
possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means, i.e. by pharmaceuticals, non-invasive brain 
stimulation, genetic modification or other means of directly modifying biology, mainly for two 
reasons. The first is that the present time brings existential threats, such as climate change or global 
poverty and inequality, which human moral psychology, i.e. a basic set of moral dispositions, with 
its cognitive and moral limitations and biases, is unfit to address (Persson & Savulescu, 2012a). The 
second reason is that traditional methods of moral enhancement may prove inadequate to achieve 
the required improvements. Persson and Savulescu (ibid.) argue that moral behaviour has a partially  
biological or genetic basis and thus that moral behaviour should be enhanced via biological or 
genetic interventions. Is this really the case? Do we really need biomedical moral enhancements? is 
biomedical moral enhancement better than traditional methods of moral enhancement? The aim of 
this chapter is to address two main questions. The first question is why human beings in fact need 
biomedical moral enhancement. The second question is what the advantages of biomedical moral 
enhancement are if compared to other more traditional methods of moral enhancement.  
In order to find an answer to the above questions, I am firstly going to look at some of the key 
claims on which arguments in support of biomedical moral enhancement are based. More 
specifically, I will explore one of the strongest and most persuasive arguments that have been 
developed in support of biomedical moral enhancement. This is the argument developed by Persson 
and Savulescu, who in a series of papers3 and a book4, develop a strong and persuasive argument in 
                                                
3 Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 2008. The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the 
Moral Character of Humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3): 162 – 177; Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 2010. 
Moral Transhumanism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35(6): 656 – 669; Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 2011. Unfit 
for the Future? Human Nature, Scientific Progress, and the Need for Moral Enhancement, in Savulescu, J., Ter Meulen, 
R. & Kahane, G. (eds.). Enhancing Human Capacities. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 486 - 500; Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 
2012. Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine. The Monist, 95(3): 399 - 421; Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 
2013. Getting Moral Enhancement Right: The Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement. Bioethics, 27: 124 – 131; 
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support of biomedical moral enhancement. Secondly, I will explore whether biomedical moral 
enhancement represents a better solution to individuals’ moral deficiencies when compared to more 
traditional methods of moral enhancement. 
The Case for Biomedical Moral Enhancement 
 In Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement, Persson and Savulescu (2012a) 
develop a persuasive argument in support of biomedical moral enhancement. The authors (ibid.) 
state that biomedical moral enhancement is both urgent and necessary, as it represents the last hope 
for human beings to avert what they call ‘the ultimate harm’. The ultimate harm is something that 
will forever extinguish sentient life or damage its conditions so drastically that, in general, life will 
not henceforth be worth living. The urgency and necessity of biomedical moral enhancement are 
results of the fact that, according to Persson and Savulescu (2012a), human beings are morally 
unfit, i.e. unable, to cope and deal with the existential threats of modern times, such as climate 
change, terrorism, global poverty and inequality. Such threats cannot be avoided or solved if human 
beings do not first overcome their moral limitations and deficiencies.  
On the basis of scientific findings from evolutionary biology and psychology, Persson and 
Savulescu (2013) hypothesize that the moral psychology of humans is unfit to cope with current 
existential threats because it evolved in conditions that were radically different from today’s 
conditions: “through virtually all their history, humans have lived in societies small enough for 
everybody to know each other, with simple technology which permitted them to affect only their 
immediate surroundings, and only in the immediate future” (ibid.: 124).  In other words, for almost 
as long as humans have walked this earth, the geographical and temporal scope of human action has 
been limited. As a result, their moral psychology evolved in order to fit these living conditions. 
However, in modern times these living conditions have radically changed as a result of scientific 
                                                                                                                                                            
Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 2014. Against Fetishism about Egalitarianism and In Defence of Cautious Moral 
Bioenhancement. The American Journal of Bioethics, 14(1): 39 - 42. 
 
4 Persson, I. & Savulescu, J. 2012. Unfit for the Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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and technological progress. Many human beings now live in larger societies, and have advanced 
scientific technology at their disposal which enables them to exercise their influence all over the 
world and far into the future: “scientific and technological progress have radically changed the 
conditions of human life. Today humans live in huge societies with an advanced technology which 
enables them to affect the environment globally, far into the future” (ibid.: 124). In other words, 
according to Persson and Savulescu, there is a fundamental mismatch between scientific and 
technological progress and moral progress. While human living conditions have radically changed, 
human moral psychology remains unaltered. A significant part of the world’s population has access 
to science and technology so powerful that, if misused, it could bring about the destruction of the 
human race, as well as the whole planet. The authors therefore conclude that biomedical moral 
enhancement represents the only hope to avoid existential threats and catastrophes.  
Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu (2011) argue that the required moral enhancements should 
be pursued by means of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement. This claim is based on the 
acceptance of three main assumptions. The first one is that human beings have biologically or 
genetically based varying moral dispositions, i.e. tendencies to commit actions or omissions that are 
morally bad and can harm other sentient beings and the planet. The second is that it would be good 
to alter those moral dispositions that are morally bad because the alteration of those dispositions 
would result in the decrease in the amount of morally bad actions committed by human beings as 
well as to an increase in the amount of morally good actions performed by human beings. The last 
assumption is that traditional and already available methods of moral enhancement would fail to 
achieve the required moral enhancement. The argument developed by Persson and Savulescu is 
strong and persuasive and it is worth looking at it in more detail. The argument can be divided into 
four different claims.  
The first claim seems to appeal to common sense and intuition. It states that it is comparatively 
much easier to cause great harm than to benefit to the same extent (Persson & Savulescu, 2011). 
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Persson and Savulescu (ibid.: 125) ask us to consider the case of a man driving in a densely 
populated area and they argue that even such a simple example clearly shows the fact that it is much 
easier to cause harm than benefit. The driver could easily kill many people, they argue, just by 
ploughing into a crowd, but he would probably not have the possibility to save an equal amount of 
people by avoiding ploughing into a crowd. Critics of interventions of moral enhancement, such as 
John Harris (2011, 2016), argue that whether it would be easier to cause harm than benefit would 
depend on different factors, including context and individuals’ intentions. During a war, for 
instance, it would most probably be easier to cause harm rather than benefit. However, this does not 
imply that, in another context, the same claim would hold. Consider a different context, such as a 
hospital. In this case it would most probably be easier to cause benefit rather than harm. There are 
several other counter-examples in which it is easier for people to cause benefit than harm and which 
therefore contradict Persson and Savulescu’s claim. One of the most convincing one is the case of 
Dutch video director Jasper Schuringa. On 26 December 2009, Schuringa prevented Umar Farouk 
Abdulmatullab from igniting explosives and potentially bringing down Flight 253 flying from 
Detroit to Amsterdam. As a result, he averted a terrorist attack and saved a great number of lives.   
However, Persson and Savulescu (2011: 125) argue, the case of Schuringa represents an 
exception. Schuringa did cause more benefit than harm, but he had the opportunity to do so because 
of the specific and rare situation in which he found himself, i.e. a situation in which a large number 
of lives was threatened and he was in the position to eliminate that threat. Situations similar to 
Schuringa’s one are extremely rare and thus it seems to remain the case that people are generally 
much more frequently in circumstances in which they could kill a number of people than in 
situations in which they could save an equal number of people. Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu 
do not intend to deny that in some situations people are capable of saving a great number of lives. 
They are rather arguing that to be in position to save a number of lives is a comparatively rare 
event, which escapes people’s personal control. People have to find themselves in situations in 
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which the lives of others are under a threat that they could specifically avert (Persson & Savulescu, 
2011).  
The second claim states that due to the progress of scientific technology, we are now in a 
position to cause ultimate harm, that is, to make worthwhile life on this planet forever impossible 
(ibid.). This second claim, at first sight, also seems to be quite accurate: scientific and technological 
developments have radically changed the conditions of human life and they have significantly 
increased human power. It is a basic fact about the human condition that scientific and 
technological progress has enhanced our capacity to benefit others and to increase the average span 
and quality of human life but it also has enhanced our ability to harm and destroy. Persson and 
Savulescu (ibid.), more specifically, review two categories of means of causing ultimate harm. 
These are nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction and environmental destruction and 
climate change. With regard to the first category of means, Persson and Savulescu maintain that, 
although it is comparatively difficult to fabricate a nuclear bomb, it might in the immediate future 
be within the capacity of a well-organised terrorist group. According to the authors, biological 
weapons of mass destruction are far easier to fabricate. But the main point is not the relative 
difficulty or easiness of creating such weapons of mass destruction. The point is that “the 
exponential growth of scientific knowledge is likely to put in the hands of an increasing number of 
people such weapons of mass destruction, and if an increasing number of us acquire the capacity to 
destroy an increasing number of us, a small number of us who are malevolent or deranged enough 
to use this power will suffice to put all of us at a significantly greater risk of death and grave 
injury” (Persson & Savulescu, 2017: 49). 
Some critics of biomedical moral enhancement, such as John Harris (2011, 2016), Martin Rees 
(2004) and David Wasserman (2014), have pointed out that making people morally better might 
increase the possibility of avoiding the ultimate harm but that it is far from a complete and adequate 
solution. Rees (2004) argues that humans’ moral deficiencies only represent one of the multiple 
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possible sources of harm. The incompetence and low level of intellectual development of those who 
have access to weapons of mass destruction also pose potential problems. Rees (ibid.: 61) states: 
“disaster could be caused by someone who is merely incompetent rather than malign”. However, 
Persson and Savulescu do not deny that other factors, beside moral deficiencies, could also pose 
problems. Persson and Savulescu deliberately decide to focus their attention on malevolence and 
wickedness because they want to make a case for the need for moral enhancement. Furthermore, 
contrary to what Harris and other critics insinuate, Persson and Savulescu do not imply that it is 
only immorality which presents a problem: “To claim that there is a danger of large-scale harm 
from weapons of mass destruction unless humanity is morally enhanced only implies that it is 
necessary to remove the danger and not that to remove the danger, i.e. immorality, is sufficient” 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2013: 126 – 127). Persson and Savulescu do not believe that biomedical 
moral enhancement, understood as the best means for the eradication of individuals’ immorality, 
would solve all the problems and challenges that humanity is currently facing. However, they do 
maintain that the eradication of individuals’ immorality is a necessary – although not sufficient – 
step.  
The third claim states that human natural moral psychology is insufficient to prevent the 
occurrence of those catastrophic outcomes and thus that it is necessary to widen the horizons of 
actual human moral consciousness to successfully prevent any catastrophic outcome (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2011). According to Persson and Savulescu, human beings currently face problems, 
such as environmental disasters, global poverty and inequality, that require them to be able to make 
the morally right decisions5. However, they (2012a) argue, their current moral deficiencies seem to 
prevent them from making those decisions: “Human beings are not by nature equipped with a 
moral psychology that empowers them to cope with the moral problems that these new conditions of 
                                                
5 I personally think that the difficulty also lies in the fact that it is unclear what a morally right decision is. Persson 
and Savulescu maintain that it is because of our moral psychology deficiencies that we are unable to act. However, they 
assume that the right course of action is clear. But what about the intricateness and complexity of the situations we 
face? Do not also these factors not also play a role in our inability to decide what is the right thing to do? 
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life create. Nor could the currently favoured political system of liberal democracy overcome these 
deficiencies” (ibid.: 1). The authors argue that because human moral psychology cannot cope with 
the sort of problems we face today, biomedical moral enhancement has become an urgent need. 
Moreover, they maintain that, since human moral psychology is biologically determined, it requires 
to be altered through biological or genetic interventions. Person and Savulescu (2013) hypothesize 
that these limitations are the result of the evolutionary function of morality, which is to maximize 
the fitness of small cooperative groups competing for resources. Human moral psychology, they 
argue, evolved in conditions very different from todays’ conditions and, as a result, it involves a 
bias toward outcomes in the near future, an indifference to the suffering of great numbers and a bias 
against collective contributions to harm. The fundamental mismatch that exists between human 
moral psychology and today’s living conditions is the cause of most of the problems that we are 
facing today such as environmental catastrophes. Furthermore, exponentially increasing and widely 
accessible technological advances and rapid globalisation create threats of intentional misuse, i.e. 
nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction, and global collective action problems, such as 
the economic inequality between developed and developing countries, which human psychology is 
not set up to address. This is why biomedical moral enhancement is urgently required if human 
beings wish to avoid not only the destruction of the planet but the extinction of the human species 
itself:  
“For the majority of our 150,000 years or so on the planet, human beings lived in small, close-knit 
groups, working hard with primitive tools to scratch sufficient food and shelter from the land. 
Sometimes we competed with other small groups for limited resources. Thanks to evolution, we are 
supremely well adapted to that world, not only physically, but psychologically, socially and through 
our moral dispositions. But this is no longer the world in which we live. The rapid advances of 
science and technology have radically altered our circumstances over just a few centuries. The 
population has increased a thousand times since the agricultural revolution eight thousand years 
ago. Human societies consist of millions of people. Where our ancestors’ tools shaped the few acres 
on which they lived, the technologies we use today have effects across the world, and across time, 
with the hangovers of climate change and nuclear disaster stretching far into the future” (Savulescu 
& Persson, 2012a: 1).  
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In other words, according to Persson and Savulescu, human beings do not have the moral 
strength to rightfully make use of massive power that technological and scientific progress has 
provided them, as people are not biologically and psychologically able to deal with the new 
challenges that characterise their current living conditions. This, has led to the proliferation of free 
riders’ problems, i.e. situations in which many individuals receive the positive externality or benefit 
of a public good without contributing to paying their share of the costs of producing those benefits, 
which threaten the survival not only of human beings but also of the planet. On the one hand, 
human beings have the knowledge and the power to significantly impact not only fellow human 
beings but also the planet.  On the other hand, in terms of their moral development they are too 
weak to make use of such knowledge and power in a rightful way, nor are they biologically or 
psychologically adequately structured to deal with the challenges that they are facing. According to 
Savulescu and Persson, human moral judgement fails to deal with major problems specifically 
because it involves a bias toward short-term outcomes and toward the suffering of others that are 
near to us in terms of geographical location and time period. However, they do not explain in more 
details why interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would be preferable to traditional 
methods of moral enhancement. This is quite a lack in the theory of the authors, and I will return to 
this criticism later on. 
Other scholars, such as Mark Walker, have developed similar arguments. Walker (2009) argues 
that biomedical moral enhancement is urgently required because, to an extent, human beings are 
innately, i.e. naturally or biologically, evil. Walker (ibid.) maintains that biomedical moral 
enhancement represents the only hope available to human beings to eradicate their innate and 
biologically determined immoral tendencies. However, this argument is based on the preliminary 
acceptance of the assumption that moral traits have a biological or genetic basis. Although some 
studies have shown the existence of a link between biology and moral traits, it is still debated 
whether the correlation actually holds. Moral psychology, psychology, cognitive science and 
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neuroscience have struggled to discover and map psychological traits and their underlying 
neurophysiological mechanisms as well as the neurological systems that constitute moral reasoning 
and moral behaviour. While considerable progress has been made, there is still no complete 
knowledge of all the details and intricacies of the human mental processes that lead to the execution 
of moral and immoral action (Pustovrh & McCollister Pirc, 2016: 344 - 345). I personally think that 
in the absence of a complete understanding of the mechanisms of human moral psychology, there 
can be no agreement on whether there exists a correlation between moral traits and biology and thus 
on whether individuals could actually be morally enhanced through biomedical moral enhancement.  
However, Persson and Savulescu (2017) do not claim that our understanding of the mechanisms 
of human moral psychology is complete. Nor do they claim that the correlation between moral traits 
and biology is proven. Persson and Savulescu (ibid.: 50) defend a cautious proposal and argue that 
it could be possible to find effective and safe biomedical means of enhancing central moral 
dispositions. 
The final claim states that moral enhancement is urgent and deserves priority over other 
moralising policies and other kinds of enhancement because it is the only effective means to solve 
the problems that resulted from the mismatch between human primitive moral psychology and 
current scientific and technological power (Persson & Savulescu, 2011: 11). Human beings’ limited 
moral capabilities are not developed enough to provide them with a reason to give up their selfish 
consumerist life-styles for the sake of our distant descendants or their distant contemporaries in 
faraway places, nor to make use of the power given to them by technology and science only when it 
does not harm fellow human beings. Given the fact that human beings are psychologically 
prevented from voluntarily dealing with environmental problems such as climate change, and 
problems of human suffering, such as wars and famine, legislation is needed to enforce effective 
changes. Persson and Savulescu maintain that equipping states with more effective methods of 
surveillance over citizens, such as intelligence agencies monitoring all electromagnetic 
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transmissions, phone calls, e-mail communications etc., could also constitute effective means to 
counteract current major problems. However, those means could only assist rather than replace 
biomedical moral enhancement because of their long-term benefits (ibid.). The authors recognize 
the fact that a similar solution would transform liberal states to the totalitarian state depicted in 
George Orwell’s novel Nineteen-Eighty-Four. However, they argue that although the employment 
of such means of intelligence would violate several human rights, such as the right to privacy, these 
losses will be worth the gains (ibid.).  
Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu (2017) leave aside traditional ways of moral enhancement, 
such as education, as they claim that such ways have been proven to be ineffective. They identify 
knowledge of human biology, and particularly knowledge of genetics and neurobiology, as the – 
potentially only – hope we have to directly and effectively affect the biological and psychological 
bases of human motivation. It is important to note that Persson and Savulescu do not deny the fact 
that human beings have developed morally in the course of their history, by means of traditional 
moral education. However, they (ibid.: 49) maintain that “this development has been very modest in 
comparison to the growth of our powers of action as the result of scientific progress, and much 
more moral development must occur quickly to reduce the risk that we shall cause ultimate harm 
through our enormous powers of action”. They maintain that traditional means are less effective 
compared to biological and/or genetic means of moral enhancement when it comes to helping us 
cope with the great evils of our time: “Biomedical and genetic means may be much more effective in 
terms of both how thoroughly and quickly they could improve everyone in need of improvement” 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2008: 168).  
Having looked at the argument developed by Persson and Savulescu, in the next sections I will 
critically evaluate it. I will do so by attending to the following two questions: Do we really need 
biomedical moral enhancement? What are the advantages of interventions of biomedical moral 
enhancement compared to more traditional methods of moral enhancement? 
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Do We Really Need Biomedical Moral Enhancement?  
The analysis of Persson and Savulescu’s argument has suggested that we should take 
biomedical moral enhancement into consideration mainly for one reason, i.e. the existence of a 
fundamental mismatch between scientific and technological progress and human moral psychology. 
Human moral psychology is limited and unfit to deal with the existential threats that characterise 
current living conditions, and therefore interventions of biomedical moral enhancement are urgently 
required if human beings wish to avoid the ultimate harm. Interventions of biomedical moral 
enhancement aim at making people morally better, i.e. deepen their empathy for others and their 
sense of responsibility for the effects of their actions and omissions, and will make it easier for 
people to make choices that lessen the prospects of the ultimate harm.  
It is generally agreed that human beings are far from morally perfect and that there is ample 
room for moral enhancement. However, I think that it remains unclear why one should prefer 
interventions of biomedical moral enhancement to more traditional, and already available, methods 
of moral enhancement. The fact that there is room for improvement, is not surprising and does not 
have to imply that we need biomedical moral enhancement. As David DeGrazia (2014) argues, 
human beings already have at their disposal many different means of enhancing their moral 
capacities: “explicit moral instruction, mentoring, socialisation, carefully designed public policies, 
consciousness-raising groups, literature and other media that encourage moral reflection and 
individual efforts at improvement” (ibid.: 361). 
Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu seem to suggest that interventions of biomedical moral 
enhancement will solve most of the problems that threaten human existence, such as terrorism and 
climate change, and will avert the possibility of ultimate harm. However, as Elizabeth Fenton 
(2010) points out, Persson and Savulescu exaggerate the risks and undervalue the benefits of 
technology. Persson and Savulescu emphasise the dark side of technology such as the danger of 
mass destruction by small groups. However, technology does not only have a dark side, it also has a 
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bright side.  Consider research conducted on pathogens such as infectious bacteria and viruses. 
Such research can contribute to the treatment and prevention of various infectious diseases but, at 
the same time, it can also bring about disasters if it is misused, say by terrorists. This seems to 
suggest that the problem is far from being technology or technological progress. I think that 
technology is basically neutral. What determines whether technology will be used for good or bad 
depends on individuals’ intentions. Even though Persson and Savulescu focus on human moral 
psychology, they fail to take into account human intention, or conscious decision-making in 
general. They merely focus on the biologically determined side of human moral psychology, which 
naturally leads human beings to have certain moral values, convictions or responses. However, 
there might be a part of our moral psychology that we would consider free. We feel we can make 
decisions, and form intentions. We can choose to act, or not to act, in certain ways. So even though 
we might be biologically predisposed to value the present over the future, and our relatives, 
neighbours and fellow countrymen over people that stand further away from us, we can still decide 
to involve other people, other places and other times in our moral considerations. We can train 
ourselves to focus our care differently than what we are biologically inclined to care for. 
The same applies to moral enhancement technologies. Persson and Savulescu assume that moral 
enhancement would make people morally better and help them to avoid the ultimate harm. 
However, as Thomas Douglas (2008: 242) states “it may be that if we were to develop moral 
enhancement technologies, we would be unable to prevent their being used in undesirable ways – 
for example, to enhance self-interestedness or immorality”. As it is the case with the misuse of any 
other technology, moral enhancement technology is also open to the possibility of misuse and thus 
could have catastrophic results.  
Persson and Savulescu also overstate the role that moral enhancement, could play in the 
prevention of the ultimate harm. They identify moral enhancement as the solution to almost every 
current problem and existential threat. However, most of these problems and existential threats are 
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complex phenomena and thus cannot be reduced or solved solely from the viewpoint of morality. 
Terrorism, for instance, is a highly complex phenomenon and it is intertwined with various spheres 
including politics and economics. Furthermore, as Inmaculada de Melo-Martin and Arleen Salles 
(2015) point out, Persson and Savulescu characterise humanity’s moral ills as the result of mainly 
individual moral deficits, i.e. moral deficits in people’s motivations or dispositions. For example, in 
their article Moral Transhumanism, Persson and Savulescu (2010), focus on humans’ limited moral 
psychology to cure a number of ills, including the lack of aid to developing countries: “one factor 
behind the weakness of the inclination to aid is the hold that the act-omission doctrine has on our 
minds. Another factor is just as probably our limited altruism” (ibid.: 35). I find the assumption that 
humanity’s moral ills are the result of mainly individual moral deficits highly problematic. As 
Melo-Martin and Salles (2015) argue: “the framing of moral complex situations such as war, 
famine, terrorism and poverty, as the result of certain types of individual moral failings ignores the 
role played by structural – social, cultural, political, economic - forces in enabling and often 
promoting these evils” (ibid.: 228).  Take racism for example, and the fact that individuals can have 
racist motivations and attitudes. However, to conceptualize the problem of racism and its 
consequences mainly as the result of individual psychological factors is simplistic. Racial 
discrimination is not simply the result of individuals’ moral deficits. As de Melo-Martin and Salles 
(ibid.) state: “historical, organisational and linguistic practices are part and parcel of the problem 
of racism, and particular institutional arrangements and policies that involve unequal distribution 
of basic goods have much to do with the presence of racist discrimination”. Insofar as racism is the 
result of structural factors, it is difficult to understand how the enhancement of individuals’ moral 
psychological states will help solve the problem of racism.  
In addition, Russell Powell and Allen Buchanan (2016), argue that Persson and Savulescu 
underestimate the power of traditional methods of moral enhancement and the amount of moral 
progress that the human species has achieved by means of these methods. Persson and Savulescu 
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exaggerate the constraints evolution poses to moral progress and fail to take into account human 
being’s capacity to extend their pattern of care and concern beyond the in-group, i.e. members of 
another culture, community, ethnicity etc. Russel and Buchanan (ibid.) maintain that socio-cultural, 
and not biomedical, means of moral enhancement offer the best prospect for addressing the 
problems currently faced by human beings (ibid.: 239). For instance, the human tendency to have 
an exclusivist morality, i.e. to consider people outside their group or community as not entitled to 
be treated according to the same moral rules entitled to those who belong to the same group or 
community, is not due to biological facts but rather to environmental and historical ones: “in 
particular, we propose that exclusivist (Parochial, group-based) morality is the result of an 
adaptively plastic (conditionally expressed) moral response that is sensitive to environmental cues 
that were historically indicative of out-group threat” (ibid.: 240). Consequentially, Russell and 
Buchanan (ibid.), assert that for human beings to become morally inclusive, the out-group should 
not be perceived as a threat. This seems to suggest that inclusive morality could be fostered by 
socio-cultural innovations rather than by biomedical moral enhancement. 
What Are the Advantages of Biomedical Moral Enhancement? 
Advocates of the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement claim that, in contrast to traditional 
methods of moral enhancement, which have proven to be unsuccessful, recent developments in 
psychology and neurology seem to suggest that human morality has a biological base and should be 
altered by means of biomedical interventions. In support of this argument, Persson and Savulescu 
(2012b) report that several different scientific and medical researchers have shown that the 
administering of neurotransmitters, such as serotonin or oxytocin influences individuals’ morally 
relevant attitudes like empathy, altruism and aggressiveness. Furthermore, they argue that scientific 
studies and research have confirmed the neurophysiological base of dispositions that are morally 
relevant. In Moral enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, Persson and Savulescu (2012b) 
claim that several antidepressants and antihypertensive drugs, which are already commonly 
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employed, affect human moral behaviour as a side effect. These drugs, they argue, in many cases 
are actually administered especially in virtue of their ability to alter individuals’ moral behaviour as 
a side effect. Disulfiram, which is an anti-alcohol abuse drug, and Orlistat, which is a weight loss 
drug, are often administered to reduce sexual re-offending. Serotonin, on the other hand, represents 
another neurotransmitter implicated in moral behaviour often prescribed for depression, anxiety and 
obsessive-compulsive disorders but also to make individuals more fair-minded and willing to 
cooperate and reduce pro-social behaviour towards out-group members (ibid.: 400 – 402). 
On the basis of these results, Persson and Savulescu (ibid.) maintain that pharmacological 
interventions represent the most appropriate means by which individuals’ relevant moral traits, such 
as empathy, cooperation and trust, should be enhanced. In addition, they argue that interventions of 
biomedical moral enhancement would make people morally better, not only by enhancing their 
relevant moral traits, but also by reducing some moral defects such as racial biases and utilitarian 
judgements (Baccarini, 2014). This does not imply that Persson and Savulescu do not recognizes 
the existence of other methods of moral enhancement such as education and socialisation. However, 
they argue that such methods have proven to be inadequate and that, since moral traits are 
genetically and biologically based traits, they require to be altered by genetic and biological 
interventions. For these reasons Persson and Savulescu (2012a) conclude that biomedical moral 
enhancement represents the only hope that human beings have if they wish not only to avert 
environmental catastrophes and human suffering but also the extinction of the human species itself.  
Furthermore, similar to Persson and Savulescu, Walker also considers traditional methods of 
moral enhancement inadequate. Human moral psychology has a biological base and thus requires to 
be altered on a biological base: “For sure, it may be possible to minimize some contemporary evil 
through better socialisation, but it will never be possible to eliminate it so long as human nature 
remains unchanged” (Walker, 2009: 29). 
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However, as I have pointed out, it is still not clear whether the knowledge available on human 
beings’ psychology provides enough support for the idea that altering it would change human moral 
dispositions.  In other words, it is highly debatable whether the limited knowledge available on 
moral psychology and neuroscience could actually provide scope for the success of biomedical 
moral enhancement.  
Furthermore, according to John Sparrow (2014: 26), traditional methods of moral enhancement 
are preferable than more innovative methods of biomedical moral enhancement because they do not 
threat individuals’ freedom, autonomy and subjectivity. Sparrow (ibid.) argues that traditional 
methods of moral enhancement are based on a subject versus subject relation while, on the other 
hand, moral bio-enhancement is based on a subject versus object relation which dehumanizes the 
individual. Moral education is a communicative action, it is based on moral equality and it is open 
to counterarguments and critical evaluation. The educator usually tries to transmit a message, but 
implicit in the relationship is the requirement that the educator must be able to justify the norms, 
content and reasons that the person being educated should accept (ibid.). In addition, such a relation 
is fully compatible with the freedom of the recipient of education. Biomedical moral interventions, 
on the other hand, are far from being communicative actions. They operate in instrumental and 
technical modes; they are based on inequality since they treat the recipient as an object rather than 
as a subject. In this case the recipient cannot respond with counterarguments, his autonomy is 
severely curtailed, he is merely treated as an object over which some external influence decides to 
impose and inculcate determinate dispositions. In other words, according to Sparrow (ibid.), what is 
at stake are the freedom, autonomy and subjectivity of the individual. This is why it is not 
unreasonable to embrace traditional methods of moral enhancement, while, at the same time, to 
refuse the more innovative practice of biomedical moral enhancement. 
Secondly, but not less importantly, Persson and Savulescu, as well as other advocates of 
behaviour-oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement such as DeGrazia and Douglas, 
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maintain that traditional methods of enhancement are not effective enough. However, I think that 
one should not underestimate the importance of traditional methods of moral enhancement. As 
Harris (2016: 32 – 33) argues, traditional methods, such as education and socialisation, have been 
proved to be quite effective. They have led, for instance, to the emergence of moral principles, 
including principles of human rights and justice, and to the development of social and political 
institutions embodying these (ibid.).  
Concluding Remarks 
To summarise, Persson and Savulescu, as well as other supporters of biomedical moral 
enhancement, maintain that, because morality has a biological and genetic basis, moral 
enhancement can only be achieved by biological and genetic interventions. In addition, they argue 
that biomedical moral enhancement is urgently required because we are currently facing problems, 
such as environmental catastrophes, that pose serious risks to the survival of the planet and of the 
human species itself and that cannot be solved if human moral psychology remains unaltered. 
Supporters of biomedical moral enhancement do recognize the existence and the availability of 
several different methods of moral enhancement, such as education and socialisation, but they argue 
that such methods would either fail to achieve any successful moral enhancement or to achieve it 
before it would be too late.  
On the other hand, critics of biomedical moral enhancement tend to agree on the need for moral 
enhancement, but they maintain that such enhancement should be pursued by means of more 
traditional and already available methods of moral enhancement. The main reason for this is that, 
even if theoretically justified, the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement is, however, fraught 
with difficult questions. This thesis is particularly concerned with two of those practical questions. 
The first question has to do with the criteria for the evaluation of any possible biomedical moral 
enhancement. The second question has to do with the relation between any possible biomedical 
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moral enhancement and individuals’ freedom and autonomy. In the next chapter I will address the 
first one of those two questions into more details.  
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Chapter Three: The Criteria for Moral Enhancement 
Advocates of biomedical moral enhancement claim that the practice would make people more 
moral, more decent and, altogether, better. As such, the possibility of biomedical moral 
enhancement represents significant possibilities. I think that most people would agree that human 
beings are far from morally perfect and, as Thomas Douglas (2008: 230) rightly points out, that 
“there is clearly scope for most people to morally enhance themselves”. Despite this being 
undeniably true, it is less clear how moral enhancement should be accomplished as well as what the 
criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement should be. Supporters of biomedical moral 
enhancement claim that the practice would successfully make people better, i.e. more moral. This 
claim, however, is a normative claim and, as such, it requires to be evaluated in terms of criteria or 
standards of evaluation. What does it mean to be morally better? When is one to say that an 
individual is morally better? What are the criteria for the evaluation for biomedical moral 
enhancement? How might the alleged improvement be measured? Why should one prefer 
biomedical moral enhancement to more traditional methods of moral enhancement? If the 
proponents insist on the creation/construction of “better” people and are indeed able to “improve” 
the moral disposition of human beings, according to whose and which standards is that to be 
determined? How could such decisions be made? What should the target of enhancement be? What 
are the capabilities, dispositions or traits that we hope to enhance by means of interventions of 
biomedical moral enhancement? Secondly, but not less importantly, how are we supposed to 
evaluate whether interventions of biomedical moral enhancement achieve any real results?  
These are some of the conceptual questions raised by the possibility of biomedical moral 
enhancement. As I have pointed out, supporters of biomedical moral enhancement claim that 
interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would make people better. However, the evaluation 
of this normative claim requires two conditions. The first condition is the identification of the 
specific capabilities, dispositions or traits that represent the target of enhancement. The second 
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condition is the identification of clear and adequate standards or criteria for the evaluation in terms 
of which the potential moral enhancement might be measured. In other words, irrespective of 
whether biomedical moral enhancement could actually successfully achieve moral enhancement, in 
order to evaluate the claim that biomedical moral enhancement would make people better, one 
needs to have standards or criteria according to which the claim can be evaluated. In the absence of 
such standards or criteria, it would be impossible to evaluate whether biomedical moral 
enhancement could actually be what it is claimed for it to be. The identification of what the possible 
criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement should be is far from straightforward. This is 
because, as I have argued, different scholars embrace different moral theories or frameworks and 
thus different conceptualisations of what the notions of morality, moral enhancement and moral 
behaviour refer to. 
In this chapter, I will attempt to find an answer to the questions raised above. Before looking at 
what the possible criteria for the evaluation of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement 
could be, I will attempt to satisfy the first condition by exploring what the adequate target of 
interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, should be. Secondly, I am going to explore 
whether it would be possible to identify objective criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement. 
More specifically I will explore moral naturalism and intercultural moral objectivism as 
frameworks that could provide possible objective criteria for the evaluation of interventions of 
biomedical moral enhancement. 
The Satisfaction of The First Condition 
Scholars disagree on what the specific meaning of moral enhancement should be and they tend 
to disagree on what the target of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement should be. 
However, they tend to agree that to morally enhance an individual, generally speaking, means to 
bring about some biological or genetic alteration of some individuals’ qualities so as to increase the 
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probability that he/she will behave in the morally “right” way while reducing the chances that he 
will behave in the morally “wrong” way (Pustovrh & McCollister Pic, 2016: 345).  
This seems to imply that there exists universal agreement on what moral and immoral behaviour 
is. However, this is far from being the case. The notions of “morally right” and “morally wrong” 
often are vague and they tend to differ across societies and cultures. This seems to suggest that any 
attempt to morally enhance individuals according to specific and determinate moral views might 
well constitute a despotic act and it would violate individuals’ freedom and rights. As Owen 
Schaefer (2015) claims such a project could undermine moral pluralism. People tend to disagree on 
what a moral life should look like. Some people might think that morality requires us to stick to 
moral principles such as ‘do not kill’ or ‘do not steal’ or that morality requires behaviour in 
accordance with environmentally friendly values. Some other might think that morality requires 
behaviour in accordance with conservative values such as ‘strong partiality towards members of 
one’s own community’ and ‘acceptance of tradition’. Some might be deontologists and have non-
consequentialist commitments while some might be consequentialist and thus value good 
consequences rather than principles and norms. As Jesse Prinz (2011: 1) points out: 
“Morals vary dramatically across time and place. One group’s good can be another group’s evil. 
Consider cannibalism, which has been practiced by groups in every part of the world. Anthropologist 
Peggy Reeves Sunday found evidence for cannibalism in 34% of cultures in one cross-historical 
sample. Or consider blood sports, such as those practiced in Roman amphitheatres, in which 
thousands of excited fans watched as human beings engaged in mortal combat. Killing for pleasure 
has also been documented among headhunting cultures, in which decapitation was sometimes 
pursued as a recreational activity. Many societies have also practiced extreme forms of public 
torture and execution, as was the case in Europe before the 18th century. And there are cultures that 
engage in painful forms of body modification, such as scarification, genital infibulation, or 
footbinding – a practice that lasted in China for 1,000 years and involved the deliberate and 
excruciating crippling of young girls. Variation in attitudes towards violence is paralleled by 
variation in attitudes towards sex and marriage. When studying culturally independent societies, 
anthropologists have found that over 80% permit polygamy. Arranged marriage is also common, and 
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some cultures marry off girls while they are still pubescent or even younger. In parts of Ethiopia, half 
the girls are married before their 15th birthday”.  
Given such diversity of views about what morality requires, how can one determine what sort of 
change should count as an instance of moral improvement? 
This poses a very serious challenge to any supporter of the possibility of moral enhancement – 
including biomedical as well as traditional moral enhancement. Supporters of biomedical moral 
enhancement, such as Persson and Savulescu (2012a) and Douglas (2008), claim that this should 
not lead to paralysis. Moral pluralism and moral relativism do not represent an impassable obstacle 
for the project of biomedical moral enhancement. Despite the existence of several different moral 
theories and standpoints, it is still possible to identify sentiments, emotions, dispositions and traits 
that are almost universally associated to moral persons and regarded as morally right. Altruism, 
fairness and empathy, for instance, represent dispositions that almost every individual would regard 
as morally valuable. The aim of biomedical moral enhancement should thus be an alteration of 
individuals’ moral disposition, the enhancement of those aspects and traits that positively influence 
and impact on moral reasoning and behaviour (Pustovrh & McCollister Pirc, 2016: 348). In other 
words, as DeGrazia (2014: 4) argues, in determining what should count as instances of moral 
enhancement, one should stick to “improvements that represent points of overlapping consensus 
among competing, reasonable, moral perspectives”. DeGrazia (ibid.) argues that this area of 
overlapping consensus is fairly broad and that it is actually possible to make a list of moral defects 
that almost everyone, regardless of their moral standpoint, would recognise as moral defects. 
Instances of those moral defects include antisocial personality disorder, defective empathy, 
significant prejudices against the interests of those outside one’s group of identification and 
impulsivity in relation to violence (ibid.). 
Peter Singer (1993) also makes a similar point. He argues (ibid.) that since ancient times, 
philosophers and moralists have expressed the idea that ethical conduct is somehow universal. 
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According to Singer (ibid.:1 – 16), almost every ethical theory irrespectively of its specific content, 
depicts ethics as something that is universal, i.e. moral rules and principles that hold for all people 
in all times and all places. 
It is along these lines that most supporters of the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement 
define biomedical moral enhancement; as interventions that help individuals to act so as to bring 
about moral desirable outcomes, i.e. generally accepted norms of morality.  
However, as Douglas (2008) recognizes, proper moral enhancement requires more than a mere 
adjustment towards pro-social and more desirable behaviour. This is because, as I will argue in 
more detail in the following chapters, as pro-social or desirable behaviour does not necessarily have 
to be moral, in the same way, an increase in pro-social or desirable behaviour does not necessarily 
imply an increase of moral behaviour. Furthermore, as Richard Dees (2011) points out, there is an 
urgent need for a standard of morality “that entails the judgment that, for example, making people 
more trusting makes them morally better before we can conclude that a drug like oxytocin makes 
people more moral. In truth, of course, becoming more trusting as such does not make a person 
morally better – too much trust is morally irresponsible” (ibid.: 13). Proponents of the possibility 
of biomedical moral enhancement claim that interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would 
make people better. A definition of what moral enhancement entails is a useful but not a sufficient 
condition for the evaluation of such a normative claim. In order to evaluate the claim, precise, clear 
and objective criteria or standards of evaluation are required. In the absence of such criteria, the 
claim that interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would make people better would be 
meaningless. 
The Satisfaction of The Second Condition 
What could the criteria for the evaluation of interventions of biomedical moral enhancement be? 
Should the enhancement be measured in terms of neurophysiological improvements to some natural 
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human capacity? Or should it rather be measured relative to some preferred normative standards for 
human conduct? 
Some scholars, such as John Shook and James Giordano (2016), argue that as long as there is no 
general agreement on what morality and moral agency are, it is not possible to either define or to 
measure moral enhancement objectively. Shook and Giordano (ibid.) states that although it could be 
possible to get objective knowledge about the brain’s functioning, objective knowledge about the 
brain’s functioning is not the same as objective knowledge about moral psychology or about what is 
moral.  For this reason, it would be misleading to refer to a pharmaceutical modification of the brain 
as a reliable moral enhancer just because that modification targets some type of neurological 
activity (ibid.).  
Procedural Approach 
In the attempt to overcome this problem, in their paper Procedural Moral Enhancement, 
Schaefer and Savulescu (2016) have developed a procedural approach to moral enhancement6 
which is based on the notion of moral reliability and on the identification of six particular factors or 
capacities related to moral reasoning that should represent the target of biomedical moral 
enhancement. Those factors are logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical 
competence, openness, empathy and avoidance of bias.  The authors argue that those factors 
represent character traits that, if improved, would make people more reliably and thus morally 
better. Furthermore, they argue that this approach has three main advantages. Firstly, it avoids 
commitment to a wide variety of substantive moral claims which could be controversial. Secondly, 
it avoids begging the question for or against particular views of morality. This is because, as 
Schaefer and Savulescu (ibid.: 2) argue: “a more substantive approach where reliable agents were 
identified based on how frequently they produce the right moral judgements would require us to 
                                                
6 The procedural approach developed by Schaefer and Savulescu is not completely innovative. It is based on the 
approach developed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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prejudice the content of those moral judgements”. Thirdly, the approach allows for the 
identification of clear criteria for the practical evaluation of moral enhancement. Those criteria are 
the six factors identified above.  
Logical competence refers to the ability to make proper logical inferences and deductions, spot 
contradictions and formulate arguments whose conclusions logically follow from premises. How is 
logical competence related to moral reasoning? And how could it be measured? Schaefer and 
Savulescu argue that logical competence is central to moral reasoning because correct moral 
judgements ought to be coherent. Awareness of logical rules is not enough. Moral reasoners should 
also have conceptual understanding. Conceptual understanding includes “the clear understanding of 
moral ideas content, strength and scope and the ability to communicate that understanding 
effectively” (ibid.:3). Conceptual understanding, as criterion for the evaluation of moral 
enhancement, could be measured by examining an individual’s general capacities of reflection, 
attention to details, clarification and comprehension of abstract content. 
Another important asset for moral reasoners is empirical competence which is the knowledge of 
non-moral, empirical facts about the world. This is because, the authors argue, individuals who are 
more competent at evaluating empirical claims will more reliably ascertain the truth of empirical 
premises and thus make more reliable evaluations. Another feature that contributes to moral 
reliability is openness, intended as the ability to recognize faults in one’s reasoning processes. 
Openness is important because it enables a moral agent to reconsider his position and thus to 
potentially improve his behaviour, i.e. be morally better. However, as was the case for the first two 
factors, the authors fail to explain how empirical competence and openness might be measured as 
well as why they should represent criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement. The last two 
factors are empathy or empathetic understanding and avoidance of bias. Empathetic understanding 
refers to a particular sort of psychological competence which enables an individual to understand 
and appreciate the interests at stake in various circumstances.  
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In other words, Schaefer and Savulescu identify six factors, let us call them X; that are needed 
for morality or moral behaviour and whose improvement would result in a moral improvement. 
Consequentially, they maintain that an improvement of an individual’s capacity for X, would lead 
to that individual’s improved moral behaviour.  
According to Shook and Giordano (2016), the argument developed by Schaefer and Savulescu 
is fallacious. This is because even if X is needed for moral behaviour, this does not imply that X 
causes moral behaviour and it cannot guarantee that more X will positively influence moral 
behaviour. The same would hold for biomedical interventions that improve those individuals’ 
dispositions or emotions that are conductive to moral behaviour (ibid.).  
This seems to suggest that the criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement cannot be 
objectively identified apart from human interactions and social expectations and thus cannot escape 
moral subjectivism and relativism (ibid.). This, however, does not necessarily imply that it would 
be impossible to identify possible relative and subjective criteria for the evaluation of interventions 
of biomedical moral enhancement. 
Moral Vectoring and Moral Performance 
Shook and Giordano (2016) argue that one of the possible ways to overcome the problem of 
objective criteria of evaluation is what he refers to as moral vectoring. Let us assume that altruism 
has been identified as a moral disposition that is conducive to moral behaviour. In order to measure 
alterations in an individual’s disposition to altruism and thus alterations in his morality, one will 
have to measure the individual’s level of altruism before the enhancement takes place and compare 
it with the individual’s level of altruism after the enhancement has taken place. In other words, 
moral progress or moral enhancement should be measured in terms of the transition from a starting 
point to a final point (ibid.). 
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Alternatively, one could think of moral behaviour as a specific type of performance and thus 
measure moral enhancement in the same way in which one measures a performance i.e. against 
present well-known standards. In other words, if one thinks of moral behaviour as the execution of 
an action or the accomplishment of a given task or function, one can then evaluate how an agent 
performs moral behaviour against a set of evaluative criteria. Some of the criteria could, for 
instance, be the agent’s level of altruism or the agent’s ability to think logically.  
The identification of the criteria discussed above, seems to suggest that interventions of 
biomedical moral enhancement could only be evaluated in terms of relative criteria which depend 
on the embracing of specific conceptualisations of morality and moral enhancement. Supporters of 
interventions of emotional enhancement, for instance, would consider the positive alteration of 
determinate emotions, such as altruism, as an adequate criterion for the evaluation of moral 
enhancement. On the other side, supporters of cognitive enhancement would rather identify 
alterations in determinate cognitive functions as an adequate criterion for the evaluation of moral 
enhancement. This raises another set of questions: who is to decide what the standards for the 
evaluation of the performance of moral behaviour might be? Furthermore, is it only possible to 
evaluate the performance of moral behaviour according to relative values and standards or is it 
possible to evaluate it according to absolute and objective standards? 
Some scholars, such as Filippo Santoni de Sio, Nadira Faulmuller and Hannah Maslen (2012) 
argue that “by giving up reference to any objective ethical standard, relative and subjective 
approaches make it impossible to distinguish the concept of moral enhancement from the concept of 
mental modification” (ibid.: 15).  According to Santoni de Sio et al. (ibid.), if one wants to use the 
concept of enhancement in a coherent way, then one cannot avoid referring to objective standards. 
If one does not refer to objective standards, one cannot judge human behaviour as anything other 
than different from something else. As also Shook (2012: 10) maintains, the failure to refer to 
objective standards can lead to the acceptance of: “either subjectivism (e.g., where an ethical 
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philosopher’s verdict on the correct morality is shared by few others), or to prevailing social norms 
(by “discovering” that one’s own society gets most moral matters about right), or possibly 
intercultural objectivism (coinciding with what the “better” cultures, in that theory’s view, together 
hold to be moral)”. 
Marc Hauser (2013) also argues that it is impossible to speak of moral enhancement without 
referring to some objective standard, because the distinction between modification and 
enhancement would lose all meaning. This is because from a moral relativist point of view, 
different moral practices or different enhancements can only be said to be different and not better 
(ibid.: 5). However, the fact that a moral stance is taken from a subjective or relativist point of view, 
does not necessarily imply that an objective moral truth does not exist. The difficulty of knowing 
something is not the same thing as the impossibility to know something. Instead of the claim that it 
is impossible to find out what the objective criteria for moral enhancement could be, one should 
rather look for possible solutions. In the next sections I will consider two possible solutions, namely 
moral naturalism and intercultural moral objectivism. 
Moral Naturalism Approach 
A possible solution is offered by the standpoint of moral naturalism. The phrase moral 
naturalism refers to an approach to meta-ethics intended to cohere with naturalism in metaphysics. 
This approach is grounded in the naturalist assumption that morality, similarly to anything else that 
exists, has to be based on something in the natural world. In other words, from a naturalistic point 
of view, all facts and properties, including moral facts and moral properties, are nothing more than 
natural facts and properties, i.e. facts and properties about the natural world. This approach has two 
main advantages. Firstly, it provides a framework for organising information about the natural bases 
for human moral capacities without any commitment to a specific moral perspective or moral 
values. Secondly, by treating morality as the outcome of a biological and natural human process, it 
has the advantage of relying on science not only for the study of morality and moral behaviour but 
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also for the assessment and evaluation of moral behaviour and thus moral enhancement (Shook, 
2012). Different naturalistic theories of morality provide slightly different accounts of morality. 
However, they all maintain that virtues, vices, moral rules and principles do not have an 
independent standing or a basis in a priori reasoning.  
Addressing the issue from a minimal moral naturalism approach, which maintains that human 
morality is a naturally embodied and universally shared human practice, provides the possibility of 
relying on relevant sciences, such as behavioural and brain sciences, for studying how human 
beings manage to produce their moral valuations and perform whatever they take to be morality. As 
such, the approach allows for the identification of natural and objective7 criteria for the evaluation 
of moral behaviour and thus moral enhancement (Churchland, 2011). One way of explaining this is 
to say that moral properties, i.e. goodness and rightness, are identical with natural properties, i.e. 
properties that figure in scientific descriptions or explanations of natural phenomena. 
There are several different viewpoints within ethical naturalism. It falls outside the scope of this 
thesis to elaborate them all, but one of the most plausible viewpoints, and for our purposes most 
interesting, identifies goodness with the satisfaction of interests, where interests are understood as 
the objects of preferences. Protecting children, for instance, is a good thing because we care about 
children and thus we do not want to hurt them, i.e. we have an interest in the protection of children. 
Ethical reasoning then, i.e. reasoning about what is the right thing to do, is at heart reasoning about 
how to satisfy our interests (Rachels, 2000: 74 - 76).  
However, the moral naturalist approach has been severely criticised for a number of reasons. 
The most important objection is that it commits the naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy in 
essence entails deriving prescriptive or normative statements from descriptive or observational 
findings, i.e. to derive what ought to be from what in fact is.  As a result, although ethical assertions 
                                                
7 According to the naturalist approach, individuals share many of the same values because they are basically alike 
in their interests, needs and psychological makeup. Furthermore, since individuals are assumed to share the same 
human nature, they are also assumed to share the same basic values (Rachels, 2000: 86). 
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are supposed to be prescriptive, the moral naturalist approach translates ethical assertions into 
descriptive assertions (ibid.: 97). 
The Intercultural Moral Objectivism Approach 
The standpoint of intercultural objectivism also represents a source for the identification of 
possible criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement. This is because, according to the 
intercultural objectivism approach, there are objective and universal moral principles that are valid 
for all people, irrespective of their culture and their acceptance of specific moral frameworks. Louis 
Pojman and James Fieser (2011), for instance, argue that most human beings would agree that it is 
morally wrong to torture people just for the fun of it (ibid.: 39). This, however, raises a deeper 
question. Even if one accepts that objective moral principles exist, how are we to determine what 
those moral principles, that are supposed to apply to everyone/everywhere, are? This is an 
important and interesting question in its own right, but it falls outside the scope of this thesis to 
address it. Going back to the intercultural objectivism approach, Pojman and Fieser (2011) provide 
a brief list of principles that from the standpoint of the intercultural approach apply to 
everyone/everywhere. Those include ‘do not kill innocent people’, ‘do not cause unnecessary pain 
or suffering’, ‘do not lie or deceive’, ‘do not steal or cheat’, ‘do justice’, ‘help other people and 
keep your promises and honour your contracts’ (ibid.).  It is interesting to note that the principles 
listed by Pojman and Fieser have one thing in common, namely that, they all contribute to the 
development and function of a healthy society. Furthermore, they are very general rather than 
specific. Their aim is to guide rather than to determine. This implies that their application to 
specific circumstances is determined by the individual applying them and thus that, although they 
might be universal, their application is not.  
In other words, the intercultural objectivism approach helps us to identify what the possible 
criteria for the evaluation of moral enhancement should be, i.e.  the criteria for the evaluation of 
moral enhancement should be represented by those standards for conduct which are deemed to be 
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morally desirable by one’s own culture along with many or most other cultures. However, some 
scholars have argued that intercultural moral objectivism does not represent a viable solution. 
Santoni de Sio, Faulmuller and Maslen (2012) for instance, argue that intercultural objectivism 
cannot provide a sufficient standard against which moral enhancement can be evaluated for two 
reasons. Firstly, intercultural consensus does not always exist. Secondly, intercultural consensus 
may exist on immoral principles like slavery or sexual discrimination. In this case, regardless what 
the intercultural consensus on the topic might be; a neuro - technology that could make slaves or 
women happily accept and perpetuate their conditions could not be regarded as an instance of moral 
enhancement (ibid.: 16). 
Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the possibility of identifying objective criteria for the 
evaluation of moral enhancement interventions in general, and for the evaluation of interventions of 
biomedical moral enhancement in particular. I have briefly discussed two different frameworks for 
providing objective criteria for the evaluation of interventions of moral enhancement, namely moral 
naturalism and intercultural moral objectivism. Neither of the two approaches proved to be 
conclusive. Nevertheless, I believe that the inadequacy of these frameworks should not be taken as 
an indication that it is overall not possible to identify objective criteria for the evaluation of moral 
enhancement. More research should be devoted to the possibility and content of such objective 
criteria, for irrespective of our decision to pursue the project of biomedical moral enhancement 
specifically, they are required for the evaluation of any other types of moral enhancement, including 
traditional forms of moral enhancement such as education.   
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Chapter Four: Biomedical Moral Enhancement and Freedom 
“Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me All he could have; I made him just and right, 
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” (Milton, 1.364 – 6). 
Individuals like to consider themselves as free, i.e. they like to think of themselves as having the 
power to exercise choice and make decisions without constraints from within or without. 
Individuals like to see themselves as autonomous and self-determining beings, free to make their 
own choices and decisions, to act upon them and to choose their own path in their life. However, 
this is not always the case. Individuals’ freedom is far from being unconstrained or unrestricted. 
Individuals’ freedom is constrained by a variety of factors, such as cultural, social and economic 
backgrounds, education, socialisation, religion and social norms. Furthermore, an individual’s 
freedom is also constrained by the freedom of other individuals as well as their choices and actions. 
However, there are certain realms of action in which individuals seem to be freer than in others. 
Morality is generally assumed to represent one of those areas in which individuals are free to make 
their own choices and decisions, to act upon them and to choose their own path. It is important to 
note that this has not always be the case. As Zygmunt Bauman (1993) points out, in times before 
our modern age, individuals believed that moral choice only pertained to choosing that which was 
generally regarded as wrong; choice played no role in opting for that which is right, since that 
which is right (e.g. following God’s commands) was believed to be universally known. In as far as 
choice played any role in morality, it therefore always referred to choosing the wrong option. He 
(ibid.: 4) writes that: “life as a whole was seen as the product of Divine creation, monitored by 
Divine providence. Free will, if it existed at all, could mean only freedom to choose wrong over 
right – that is, to breach God’s commandments: to depart from the way of the world as God 
ordained it, and anything that visibly deflected from custom was seen as such a breach”. In other 
words, to be right, i.e. moral, was not a matter of choice, nor a matter of freedom, but rather of 
following the customary way of life and abiding by traditions and God’s commandments.  
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All this changed, however, with the gradual loosening of the grip of tradition and religion. In the 
modern era, morality is deeply related to individuals’ freedom and their ability to make choices and 
decisions. It is in virtue of their freedom and ability to choose that individuals are capable of acting 
morally. The big difference between pre-modernity and modernity, is that in the latter we, for the 
first time in history, are confronted with the possibility of choosing, not only the wrong thing, but 
also that which is right. That which is right is no longer self-evident in modernity as it indeed was 
in pre-modernity (Ibid.).  
John Harris (2011) argues that some interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, i.e. 
behaviour-oriented interventions, threaten and preclude individuals’ moral freedom and make the 
very notion of morality meaningless and worthless. More specifically, Harris (ibid.) maintains that 
behaviour-oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would curtail individuals’ 
freedom to fall, i.e. to commit morally wrong acts, and, in turn, their freedom to stand, i.e. to 
behave morally. According to Harris (ibid.), morally bio-enhanced individuals would act and 
behave as they are programmed or pre-determined to act, rather than as they freely and 
autonomously decide to act. However, since proper moral behaviour is the result of free, 
autonomous and responsible choices, their behaviour could not be referred to as moral. 
Harris’ objection raises a serious concern with regard to the project of biomedical moral 
enhancement. Irrespective of how moral enhancement should be assessed and the fact that 
biomedical moral enhancement only represents a possibility, a more significant question emerges. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that there are adequate criteria for the evaluation of 
moral enhancement and that biomedical enhancement is a therapy generally undertaken by most 
individuals. Let us suppose, furthermore, that interventions of biomedical moral enhancement are 
successful and that they actually make people morally better. What would the price of such moral 
enhancement be? Would interventions of biomedical moral enhancement curtail individuals’ 
freedom?  
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Will bio-enhanced individuals be morally better because they have been programmed or 
determined to be so? And, if this is the case, how can a true moral disposition, which seemingly 
inevitably involves the agent’s freedom to choose, be reconciled with the social determinism that 
seems to inevitably follow from interventions of biomedical moral enhancement? Can true freedom 
survive a practice where people may make choices that ensure less suffering (for humans, animals 
and plants) on earth, but have or remain with little choice in the matter? Is human freedom not 
fundamentally compromised by any effort to pre-determine the choices that people can make? In 
short, what happens to the nature and practice of morality in a situation where moral choice – which 
seemingly inevitably involves the possibility of making “wrong” choices (i.e. choices that may 
continue to have negative effects on the issues mentioned earlier) – is either terminated or 
significantly curtailed? I find this problem particularly intriguing, not least because it shares so 
much with the arguments made by theists in response to the infamous problem of evil8. 
Before looking at the relation between individuals’ freedom and morality and before exploring 
to what extent and to what degree interventions of biomedical moral enhancement could affect this 
relation, it is necessary to clarify the freedom to fall objection and to critically assess whether and to 
what extent interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would actually threaten individuals’ 
freedom to fall. In order to do so, I will firstly look at Harris’ objection and clarify what the kind of 
freedom that might be threatened by interventions of biomedical moral enhancement is. Taking 
Harris’ freedom to fall argument as a starting point, I will argue that what is at stake is specifically 
this freedom to commit moral wrongs. Secondly, I will look, in more details, at the notion of the 
freedom to fall. More specifically, I will argue that the notion of the freedom to fall should be 
understood as a kind of existential freedom which includes both the freedom of action and the 
freedom of choice and that it is of utmost value because it is strictly related to autonomy. 
                                                
8 The problem of evil represents one of the most debated topics in theism and it refers to the question of how to 
reconcile the existence of evil with an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God. 
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Furthermore, I will argue that the freedom to fall is actually threatened by some kind of 
interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, namely behaviour-oriented interventions. 
Then, I will consider and evaluate whether the curtailment of individuals’ freedom to fall, which 
seems to inevitably follow from interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, might be 
reconciled with the possibility of moral behaviour. More specifically, I will argue that behaviour-
oriented interventions render the notion of morality meaningless because, by curtailing individuals’ 
freedom to fall, they also curtail two important requirements for moral behaviour whose exercise 
necessarily depends on the freedom to fall, namely reasoning and responsibility. 
Harris’ Objection 
In his article “Morality and Freedom”, Harris (2011) develops a strong and persuasive argument 
against the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement. He severely criticises the project mainly 
because of two reasons. The first is that it will curtail individuals’ freedom to fall and their 
autonomy, i.e. individuals’ ability to choose their own path through life, to freely take their 
decisions and to act upon them. The second one is that, by pre-determining or programming 
individuals’ behaviour, behaviour-oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would 
render the very notion of morality meaningless and worthless rather than making individuals 
morally better (ibid.).  
It is important to note that as Harris (2016: 77 – 78) himself claims: “Let me make clear at once 
that I do not believe there is anything inherently wrong with moral bio-enhancement. I have been an 
advocate for human enhancement for over thirty years, writing four books defending such 
enhancements. […] Unlike Buchanan, however, I do not define enhancements in terms of the 
intention or the motivation of those who produce them, but rather in terms of their effects”. Harris 
does not object to, or criticize, every instance of moral enhancement. As it has been argued in the 
previous chapters, the notion of biomedical moral enhancement is used to refer to different types of 
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interventions which have different aims and which make use of different means. Harris (2016: 7 – 
8) criticizes a specific type of moral enhancement:  
“now neuroscience is developing interventions that act directly on the brain, influencing behaviour, 
attitudes, and dispositions, affecting motivation, and, some claim, raising the possibility of adding 
moral enhancement to physical and cognitive enhancement. These possibilities, if that is what they 
are, raise important issues of liberty and responsibility which not only affect our sense of who and 
what we are, but literally of the extent to which we are, or can remain, masters of our fate, entities 
which create ourselves by our decisions and actions”.  
Harris then is critical of those intervention of biomedical moral enhancement whose aim is to 
predict or program individuals’ behaviour irrespectively of the means they use to achieve such an 
aim. In what follows, I am going to use the term behaviour-oriented interventions to refer to this 
kind of moral enhancement.  
Back to Harris’ objection, his argument is based on two claims. The first claim is that individual 
moral liberty, which he refers to as the freedom to fall, is of utmost importance. As I am going to 
argue below, this is because it is deeply related to individuals’ autonomy. The second claim, is that 
the freedom to fall represents a necessary pre-requisite for morality and moral behaviour. I will 
elaborate this in more detail, but in short this is to say that there is no virtue in doing what one must 
do. For something to be moral, it has to be the result of a free and responsible choice. Starting from 
those two claims, Harris (2011) argues that the curtailment of individuals’ freedom to fall would not 
only negatively impact individuals’ freedom to act in a morally deplorable way but also their ability 
to act morally at all. This is because, according to Harris, something can only have moral value or 
meaning if it is the result of a free and autonomous choice: “autonomy surely requires not only the 
possibility of falling but the freedom to choose to fall, and the same autonomy gives us self-
sufficiency” (ibid.: 104). By making it impossible for individuals to act immorally, behaviour-
oriented interventions would also make it impossible for individuals to be virtuous and to act 
morally. In the absence of the freedom to act immorally, to act morally would become a mechanical 
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act rather than a free choice. In the absence of the freedom to fall, individuals would not act out of 
freedom but rather because they have been designed, in some way, to act in a certain way. As a 
result, Harris (ibid.: 110) argues, morality would be replaced by moral compulsion: “doing the good 
will not be a choice but a mechanical act and, since there is no virtue in doing what one has to do, 
such a mechanical act would not be worth neither moral appraisal nor moral blame: sufficiency to 
stand is worthless without the freedom to fall”. 
It is important to note that, according to Harris, the problem is not that individuals will not be 
able to act immorally; but rather that individuals would lose their ability to be virtuous and to act 
morally in the first place. However, in order to make sense of Harris’ objection it is necessary to 
clarify the notion of the freedom to fall and to critically consider and assess whether behaviour-
oriented interventions would actually threaten individuals’ freedom to fall.  
The Freedom to Fall 
In an allusion to John Milton9, Harris refers to the kind of freedom threatened by behaviour-
oriented interventions of moral enhancement as the freedom to fall. On a first reading, the freedom 
to fall seems to refer to individuals’ freedom to act in a morally wrong way. However, as Jonathan 
Pugh (2017) points out, Harris fails to adequately explain what kind of freedom is threatened by the 
possibility of biomedical moral enhancement and, as a result, the notion of the freedom to fall 
remains ambiguous and unclear. Furthermore, Pugh (ibid.) argues that the ambiguous nature of 
Harris’s notion of the freedom to fall is exacerbated by the fact that in some passages Harris relates 
the notion of the freedom to fall to the notion of autonomy and he seems to suggest that the freedom 
to fall should be understood to incorporate both the freedom of action to do immoral things and the 
freedom of choice to perform those actions (ibid.). How should the notion of the freedom to fall be 
understood? It is possible to identify, at least, three potential candidates for an appropriate 
                                                
9 John Milton (1608 – 1674) was an English poet. In his famous epic poem Paradise Lost (1667) he used the notion 
of the freedom to fall. 
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understanding of the notion of the freedom to fall. These three possible candidates are the freedom 
of action, the freedom of choice and free will. I will look at each of these three kinds of freedom 
separately and show that none of them adequately covers the realm of the freedom to fall. I will 
then propose an alternative interpretation of the notion of the freedom to fall which is based on an 
existentialist understanding of freedom, which includes both the freedom of action and the freedom 
of choice. 
Pugh (2017) claims that, on a first reading, the freedom to fall seems to refer to an individual’s 
freedom to act in a morally wrong way. However, if one takes the freedom to fall to merely refer to 
the freedom to act in a morally wrong way, Harris’s critique is not very impressive. As has been 
argued by several advocates of the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement, such as Douglas 
(2008: 146), the loss of individuals’ freedom to fall, understood as an individual’s freedom to act 
immorally, is a bearable loss: “In many cases it seems preferable to sacrifice some freedom to do 
evil in order to prevent evil. If I witness one person about to murder another one, it seems that I 
should intervene to prevent the murder even though this involves restricting the prospective 
murder’s freedom do to do evil”. Moreover, as DeGrazia (2014: 367) points out, in some cases the 
curtailment of an individual’s freedom to act immorally does not even represent a great loss: “the 
elimination of freedom [to fall] with respect to rape and child molestation is no great loss”. 
In this respect, I side with the critics. As long as one understands the freedom to fall merely as 
the freedom to act in a morally wrong way, the curtailment of such a freedom does not seems to 
pose a serious problem or, at least, not an insurmountable one. However, as Christoph Bublitz 
(2016) claims, the notion of individuals’ freedom of action does not capture the entire space of the 
freedom to fall. The freedom of action is deeply related to another kind of freedom, namely the 
freedom of choice, i.e. the freedom to choose to fall, to do the morally wrong thing. In his article 
Morality and Freedom, Harris (2011: 103) himself claims that the kind of freedom he is talking 
about has to be understood as “the exhilaration and joy of choosing - and changing at will - our 
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own path through life”. In a later passage Harris (2014: 130) remarks that “while we are free to fall 
[…] we have the wherewithal to stand if we choose”. Harris’ insistence on the importance of the 
ability to choose seems to suggest that the notion of the freedom to fall should be interpreted as a 
particular kind of the freedom to choose: the freedom to choose to act immorally.  
This implies that, in order to make sense of the notion of the freedom to fall, one must 
understand the notions of freedom of action and freedom of choice as two sides of the same coin. 
As Harris (2014: 249) argues, the value of the two freedoms is not easily distinguished: “Agents are 
quintessentially actors; to be an agent is to be capable of action. Without agency, in this sense, 
decision-making is […] both morally and practically barren – literally without issue!”. 
Although the freedom of action and freedom of choice refer to different dimensions of the 
freedom to fall, they are deeply related and cannot, and should not, be considered in isolation. The 
reason for this is that an individual will only be able to take advantage of his freedom of action to 
perform X if he is first able to form the motivating desire to perform X in the first case. In other 
words, freedom of choice is prior to freedom of action (Pugh, 2017: 4).  
Some other scholars, such as Persson and Savulescu (2012b), argue that Harris’ argument might 
also be warranted in respect of another sense of freedom: the freedom of will. Harris (2011: 103) 
himself quotes a section of Book III of Milton’s Paradise Lost and he claims that “these lines have 
inspired many writers about the human condition and about the precious nature of freedom and in 
particular free will”. Free will is an ambiguous notion and it has been defined and understood 
differently. Some accounts of free will hold that freedom is only possible in an undetermined world. 
According to those approaches the will sits outside the causal order of the universe and individuals 
are free whenever they make a decision to act and act upon such decision. Other theories of free 
will are compatibilist and they hold that free will is situated within the causal order. According to 
those approaches individuals act freely whenever their actions are produced by the right kind of 
mental-neural mechanism. Most compatibilist accounts of free will maintain that the right kind of 
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mental-neural mechanisms are those in which agents are reasons-responsive and in which agents’ 
actions are consistent with their character and higher order preferences (Danaher, 2016)10. 
Advocates of the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement, such as DeGrazia, as well as 
Persson and Savulescu, have taken into consideration both of the two different accounts of free will, 
the incompatibilism and the compatibilism views, and they have argued that none of them is 
seriously threatened by the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement. From an incompatibilist 
view, interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would not threaten individuals’ free will 
because they would be limited by individuals’ indeterministic freedom. DeGrazia (2014: 365) 
claims: “if freedom involves radical independence from the causal order, then moral biomedical 
enhancement, as part of the causal order, cannot touch it”. 
On the other side, if human free will is compatible with it being fully determined whether or not 
we shall do what we take to be the good and right, interventions of biomedical moral enhancement 
will not reduce individuals’ freedom but only make them more often determined to do what we take 
to be the good. In sum, irrespective of whether indeterminism or determinism reigns in the realm of 
human actions, it seems that interventions of biomedical moral enhancement would not curtail 
individuals’ freedom. 
Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu (2012b) have argued that individuals who have free will 
can hardly be said to lose their freedom only because their sense of justice or altruism gets 
enhanced. Persson and Savulescu (ibid.) illustrate their point through an example. They (ibid.: 409) 
argue that women tend to be more empathetic and less aggressive than men. However, they (ibid.) 
argue, biomedical interventions that would successfully make men more similar to women and thus 
more empathetic and less aggressive, would not limit men’s freedom. The authors argue that 
morally enhanced individuals will act for the same reasons which motivate individuals who are 
                                                
10 The account of reason-responsiveness was developed by John Martin Fisher and Mark Ravizza in their book 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (1998). According to this account an agent is morally 
responsible only if he/she is able to recognize and react to reasons. 
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already morally good. This implies that morally enhanced individuals will not be less free that 
individuals who are not morally enhanced (ibid.).  
I think that one should carefully distinguish between moral necessity and natural necessity. The 
fact that natural necessity does not curtail an individual’s freedom, does not necessarily have to 
imply that moral necessity, i.e. psychological causation, would also not pose a threat to an 
individual’s freedom. However, Harris (2014: 372) argues that the kind of freedom he is talking 
about has very little to do with the notion of free will: “all this talk about free will determinism or 
compatibilism is just smoke and mirrors in the context”. Harris (2011: 103) claims that what he is 
concerned with is freedom in its existential sense, i.e. individuals’ freedom to choose their own path 
through life. The kind of freedom Harris is concerned with is that which makes human beings 
autonomous.  The kind of freedom Harris is concerned with is not entirely captured by the notion of 
the freedom to act immorally, or by the notion of the freedom to choose to act immorally nor by the 
notion of the freedom of will. The freedom Harris is concerned with is of a more fundamental and 
encompassing kind.  
Harris (2016: 79) claims that the kind of freedom he is talking about is “the freedom that any 
rational person accepts is inhibited by threats, diminished by the foreclosure of options and 
enhanced by education and civil liberties”. This freedom enables “individuals to consider which 
course of action best fulfils his or her moral preferences and objectives, all things considered” 
(ibid.: 80). This seems to suggest that an individual’s freedom to fall entails more than his freedom 
of action, choice or will. The freedom to fall refers to a kind of primordial freedom and it is deeply 
related to the human nature. According to Harris (2011: 103), God, nature or evolution has given 
human beings a vigorous sense of justice and right and this is why human beings are “sufficient to 
have stood though free to fall”. Harris maintains that human beings naturally possess a sense of 
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morality. At the same time, however, they are free, in the existential sense11 described by William 
Gerald Golding12. This existential freedom enables individuals to choose their own path through life 
(Golding, 1959: 5). It is in virtue of possessing this kind of freedom that human beings are not only 
able to, but also called to, freely choose whether to stand or to fall. 
This kind of freedom is of utmost importance because, as Harris (2011: 104) argues, the 
freedom to fall is a necessary requirement for the exercise of autonomy13, and for the possibility of 
virtue. He (2016: 96) defines autonomy as “the ability to choose freely” and for the possibility of 
virtue (Harris, 2011: 104). To be virtuous he (2014: 372) defines as having “the ability to choose 
rationally and freely according to principles and practices that are plausible as candidates for 
moral action”. Harris claims that the possibility of virtue depends on the exercise of the freedom to 
fall. The freedom to fall is that which enables people to translate their knowledge of the good into 
doing the good. He (2016: 60) writes:  
“One thing we can say with confidence is that ethical expertise is not ‘being better at being good’, 
rather it is being better at knowing the good and understanding what is likely to conduce to the good. 
The space between knowing the good and doing the good is a region entirely inhabited by freedom. 
Knowledge of the good is sufficiency to have stood, but freedom to fall, is all. Without the freedom to 
fall, good cannot be a choice and freedom disappears and along with virtue. There is no virtue in 
doing what you must”. 
Harris (2014: 372) argues that it is because of their natural condition, i.e. sufficiency to stand 
and freedom to fall, that human beings are autonomous beings: “autonomy surely requires not only 
the possibility of falling but the freedom to choose to fall, and that same autonomy gives us self-
                                                
11 Not ‘freedom from’ but ‘freedom to’. For more information see Berlin, I. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
12 William Gerald Golding (1911 – 1993) was a writer of fiction, plays and poetry from English descendent, who 
was awarded the Noble Prize for Literature as well as the Booker Prize for Fiction. 
13 Different thinkers have provided different accounts and definitions of the notion of autonomy. For the sake of the 
argument developed in this paper the notion of autonomy has to be understood as referring to the authenticity of the 
desires and motives that move one to act in the first place and thus as one’s independence from external manipulation 
(Christman, 2015). In other words, to be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, 
desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not externally imposed, but are part of what can be considered one’s 
authentic self. 
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sufficiency”. In this respect, the notion of the freedom to fall seems to be based on the Kantian 
notion of freedom, i.e. freedom as autonomy.  
In it is virtue of the freedom to fall that human beings have the ability to make decisions and to 
create themselves: “decisions, then, are not only world creating; they are self-defining. We are the 
product of our past decisions; they are in large part responsible for making us what we are, and 
our history and our future are defined by them. We are the persons we make of ourselves” (ibid.: 
249). This means that freedom, rather than being characterised by randomness or arbitrariness, 
consists in binding oneself to a law, but a law that is given by oneself in recognition of one’s 
responsibilities. According to Harris (2016: 96): “autonomy is self-government” and, as such, it 
consists in the exercise of power and responsibility. Harris (ibid.: 85 – 86) compares individuals’ 
self-government to political forms of government, specifically to democracies. In democracies, the 
power of people is exercised through representatives, who act and choose on their behalf, in their 
interests and for their protection.  In order to do this, in a democratic state structure, representatives 
have to make decisions, they have to decide, for instance, whether to intervene or not to intervene, 
whether to act or to refrain from action. It is only by making decisions that democracies can make a 
difference to people’s lives and to protect people’s interests. In the same way that governments are 
held accountable and responsible for their decisions and their consequences, individuals are held 
accountable and responsible for their decisions and their effects and outcomes: “Individuals are 
responsible for the way in which they govern themselves and for the effects of so doing” (ibid.: 96). 
The fact that human beings are free to choose and act in accordance with their choices makes them 
autonomous, i.e. when they stand or fall they do so because they choose to do so. Moreover, the 
freedom to fall, understood as the possibility to make autonomous and free choices, is what enables 
human beings to constitute themselves as selves and to make a difference in the world around them. 
These abilities in particular, and individual autonomy in general, would have to be curtailed if 
the freedom to fall were to be limited. Furthermore, the limitation of individuals’ freedom to fall 
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would restrict individuals’ sufficiency to have stood, i.e. their ability to explain and justify their 
choices (ibid.: 98).  
It is this kind of freedom, Harris argues, that is threatened by behaviour-oriented interventions 
of biomedical moral enhancement. Is this kind of freedom actually threatened by those 
interventions? And if this is the case, how and why do those interventions threaten individuals’ 
freedom to fall?  
Biomedical Moral Enhancement: A Threat to Individuals’ Freedom to Fall 
Harris (2014) argues that behaviour-oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement 
might pose a threat to individuals’ freedom to fall. These interventions threaten individuals’ 
freedom to fall because they bypass reasoning and directly attempt to manipulate attitudes, 
dispositions or emotions in order to pre-determine individuals’ behaviour. The manipulation of 
individuals’ attitudes subverts an individual’s freedom to fall, understood as: “the freedom to decide 
whether or not to fall for reasons, which have to do with what is best all things considered” (ibid.: 
373). Once individuals would be morally enhanced by innovative biotechnologies, they will be 
determined, rather than influenced, to act according to specific moral standards and, as a result, they 
will lose their freedom. Behaviour-oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement lead to 
a situation in which individuals are no longer free to make actual choices. This is because these 
interventions impede freedom, since they respond directly to attitudes and bypass the ability to 
differentiate between right and wrong. These interventions “inhibit individuals from considering 
which course of action best fulfils their moral preferences and objectives all things considered” 
(Harris, 2016: 80) and, as such, “they are indeed “freedom-subverting”” (ibid.). Climate change, for 
instance, represents an environmental problem that could most probably be solved if individuals 
were to decide to take more into consideration the environment and its value while making their 
individual choices. Given the reticence of most individuals to freely decide to do so, some 
advocates of the possibility of biomedical moral enhancement, such as Persson and Savulescu, 
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argue that this could be solved by biomedically enhancing individuals so that they would actually 
take into consideration the environment and its value while making their individual choices. 
However, according to Harris (2016), this implies that interventions of biomedical moral 
enhancement would curtail individuals’ freedom because they will bypass reasoning and determine 
individuals’ moral choices and behaviour rather than enhancing them. As Harris (ibid.: 82) argues, 
anything which, by influencing attitudes and emotional responses “inhibits individuals’ ability to 
decide whether or not to fall for reasons which have to do with what is best “all things considered” 
[…] is inimical to freedom”.  
Furthermore, since an individual’s freedom to fall is deeply related to his autonomy and his 
status as human being, behaviour-oriented interventions rob an individual of his autonomy and 
status as human being.  
Behaviour-oriented interventions threaten individuals’ autonomy, i.e. ability to make decisions 
and to act upon them because, as has I have argued, the kind of freedom that is at stake has to be 
understood as an individual’s ability to act on coherent and authentic preferences and thus it is 
deeply related to autonomy. When considering autonomy, what matters is not only the individual 
having preferences, but also how an individual has acquired the preferences he has. This implies 
that preferences that are brought about through reason bypassing interventions, such as behaviour-
oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, somehow curtail individuals’ autonomy 
(Bublitz, 2016: 94). 
Persson and Savulescu object to Harris’ claim and maintain that interventions of biomedical 
moral enhancement would not pose a threat to individuals’ freedom to fall. They (2012b: 410) 
illustrate their criticism with the thought experiment of the God Machine:  
“The great Moral Project was completed in 2045. This involved construction of the most powerful, 
self-learning, self-developing bioquantum computer ever constructed called the God Machine. The 
God Machine would monitor the thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions of every human being. It 
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was capable of modifying these within nanoseconds, without the conscious recognition by any human 
subjects. The God Machine was designed to give human beings near complete freedom. It only ever 
intervened in human action to prevent great harm, injustice or other deeply immoral behaviour from 
occurring. For example, murder of innocent people no longer occurred. As soon as a person formed 
the intention to murder, and it became inevitable that this person would act to kill, the God machine 
would intervene. The would-be murderer would change his mind. The God Machine would not 
intervene in trivial immoral acts, like minor instances of lying or cheating. It was only when a 
threshold insult to some sentient beings’ interests was crossed would the God Machine exercise its 
almighty power”. 
Persson and Savulescu (ibid.: 411) maintain that the only difference between the existence of 
laws and the instalment of the God Machine is that while laws prohibit certain behaviours on pain 
of punishment, the instalment of the God Machine makes it impossible for individuals to act 
immorally. However, I personally think that this is not exactly the case. Although laws do prohibit 
individuals to act immorally on pain of punishment, they do not inhibit individuals from acting 
immorally. In other words, although laws attach specific consequences to specific behaviours, they 
do not inhibit individuals’ freedom. In the case of the God Machine, on the other hand, freedom, 
understood as the possibility to choose between two or more courses of action, is denied to 
individuals. Furthermore, as Harris (2016: 108) argues, Persson and Savulescu fail to recognize the 
distinction, emphasised by Ronald Dworkin (1977: 266 - 267), between liberty and licence. Liberty 
is a moral and political concept, an idea, an ideal and a value. Liberty is required for autonomy or 
self-rule, and is deeply related to independence. Licence, on the other hand, refers to the extent to 
which a person is free from social or legal constraint to do what he wishes to do (ibid.).  
Persson and Savulescu (2012b: 411) also object to Harris’ claim that interventions of moral 
enhancement would threaten individuals’ autonomy: “human beings can still autonomously choose 
to be moral, since if they choose the moral action, the God Machine will not intervene. Indeed, they 
are free to be moral. They are only unfree to do grossly immoral acts, like killing or raping”. 
However, I do not think that Persson and Savulescu are right. In order to be free to choose one 
needs to have more than one possibility. The God Machine leaves individuals only the choice to 
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stand, or to be moral, and one cannot truly be considered free when one has merely one choice. 
Individuals are only free to choose as long as they choose what is permitted by the God Machine. 
However, this is not the same of being free to choose. Consider the following example. Individual 
X is faced with a choice: he can either decide to have coffee or to have tea. However, if he decides 
to have coffee, he can actually have coffee, whereas, if he decides to have tea, someone else is 
going to persuade him that what he actually wants is coffee. Is individual X free to choose between 
coffee and tea? I do not think he is, at least not more than someone else would be who could choose 
only one option.   
Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu (ibid.) claim that “There is one way in which the God Machine 
would not compromise autonomy, that is, even if it did prevent people from acting immorally. This 
would be the case if people voluntarily chose to be connected. Voluntarily connecting to the God 
Machine would then be an example of a precommitment contract, the paradigm example of which is 
Ulysses and the Sirens”. 
But according to Harris (2014), there is no real analogy between the story of Ulysses and the God 
Machine. Ulysses’ imprisonment has a brief duration and it is fully voluntary: “it is like agreeing to 
be sedated for a surgical operation during which one loses the power to say, ‘Stop cutting’” (ibid.: 
256). Furthermore, Harris (ibid.) argues: “the proper analogy with the God Machine is selling or 
giving yourself into slavery, a condition that is open ended and potentially endless. The rule of the 
God Machine is literally the rule of a slave-owning tyrant, which, as Savulescu and Persson admit, 
compromise autonomy”. Now, almost everyone would agree that the freedom to sell oneself into 
slavery is a prime example of a free act that denies the very liberty it supposedly expresses. The 
freedom to sell oneself into slavery is incompatible with the very essence of freedom. 
To summarise, I have argued that determinate types of moral enhancement, i.e. behaviour-
oriented interventions, would actually pose a threat to an individual’s freedom to fall, as understood 
by Harris. However, Harris’s critique goes even further. Harris claims that behaviour-oriented 
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interventions would not only curtail individuals’ freedom to fall and their autonomy, but they would 
also make the very notions of morality and moral agency meaningless. This is because, by making 
it impossible for human beings to fall, behaviour-oriented interventions would also force human 
beings to stand. However, if one stands because one has been determined or programmed to do so, 
rather than because one has freely and autonomously chosen to do so, the very act of standing loses 
its moral value and meaning: “sufficiency to stand is worthless, literally morally bankrupt, without 
freedom to fall” (Harris, 2011: 110).  
Harris (2011) claims that the freedom to fall represents a necessary pre-requisite for morality. 
According to Harris, a decision to act in a morally right way is morally worthless if one is not free 
not to make the decision. In the next part of this chapter, I will critically evaluate Harris’ claim and 
assess whether the freedom to fall in fact is a necessary requirement for moral behaviour and thus 
whether behaviour-oriented interventions would make the very notion of morality meaningless and 
worthless. 
The Freedom to Fall and Morality 
I have argued that interventions of biomedical moral enhancement threaten individuals’ freedom 
to fall and their autonomy. At the end of the discussion, however, a deeper question has arisen. This 
question has to with the relation between the curtailment of individuals’ freedom to fall and 
individuals’ ability to engage in moral behaviour. Given that interventions of biomedical moral 
enhancement would result in the curtailment of an individual’s freedom to fall, how would such a 
curtailment influence individuals’ ability to engage in moral behaviour? Can and should someone, 
who is not free to fall and forced to stand, be said to behave morally? 
This problem is clearly illustrated by Michael Hauskeller’s (2013) interpretation of the freedom 
to fall objection. As John Danaher (2016) explains, Hauskeller illustrates the freedom to fall’s 
objection with a story, the story of the Little Alex. The story, which comes from Antony Burgess’s 
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novel A Clockwork Orange, tells about Little Alex, a young man prone to acts of violence. Little 
Alex is captured by the authorities and forced to undergo a form of aversion therapy. He is given 
medication that makes him nauseous and then he is repeatedly exposed to violent imagery. The 
therapy works and when Little Alex leaves captivity he still feels violent urges but these are 
accompanied by feelings of nausea that distract him. As a result, Little Alex does no longer act out 
of violence and he achieves moral conformity14 , i.e. he is morally better. Hauskeller, talking 
through one of the characters of the story, suggests that, although the induced nausea compels Little 
Alex to do good, Alex’s induced goodness is actually not really good at all (Danaher, 2016). 
According to Hauskeller (2013), the aversion therapy takes away from Alex the choice to do the 
bad, i.e. to act out of violence, and forces him to do the good, i.e. to refuse to respond to his violent 
urges. However, Hauskeller (2013: 75) maintains that, it is better, all things considered, to have the 
freedom to do the bad than to be forced to do the good:  
“This is what I call the “Little Alex” problem […] it invites us to share a certain moral intuition 
(namely that it is in some unspecified way bad or wrong or inhuman to force people into goodness) 
and thus to accept the ensuing paradox that under certain conditions the bad is better than the good 
— because it is not only suggested that it is wrong to force people to be good (which is fairly 
uncontroversial) but also that the resulting goodness is somehow tainted and devaluated by the way 
it has been produced”. 
Is Hauskeller right? Is it true that under certain conditions, namely when acting morally, to be 
able to commit wrong is actually better than being forced to do good? Is it true that the process 
leading to an individual’s decision to act in a morally good or bad manner, not only influences but 
actually determines the value of his action? Can a morally good action be considered worthwhile of 
moral value even if it does not represent the result of an individual free choice?  
These questions are important and they need to be addressed. In order to find an answer to the 
above questions, I am going to consider whether the curtailment of the freedom to fall would impact 
                                                
14 Moral conformity occurs when an agent’s conduct coincides with moral reasons (Douglas, 2014: 75) 
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our common understanding of morality and the possibility of moral behaviour. This, however, 
cannot be done without clarifying what moral agency and moral behaviour refer to.  
Moral behaviour, in its broadest terms, refers to a kind of behaviour that is carried out according 
to one’s beliefs, moral values or standards.  However, as stated by G. H. von Wright: “[...] the 
grounds have not been fixed, there is no settled opinion as to what the grounds are” (von Wright in 
Frankena, 1970: 150). This is mainly due to the fact that different scholars embrace different, 
divergent and rival moral frameworks and theories which are grounded on different interpretations 
of what the terms morality and moral should refer to and which, as a result, expound different 
conceptions of what it means to behave morally. A detailed description and discussion of all the 
existent moral theories and perspectives would be beyond the scope of this thesis.  
For the purpose of this thesis I am going to use the phrase moral behaviour to refer to a specific 
type of behaviour which is characterised by two different features, namely reasoning and 
responsibility both of which are grounded in the freedom to fall. 
Moral Behaviour and Reasoning 
Moral behaviour is intentionally rather than accidentally or unconsciously enacted. Moral 
behaviour occurs as the result of an agent’s deliberate and intended choice to act in a determinate 
manner. Moral behaviour is grounded on moral reasoning, i.e. practical reasoning about what, 
morally speaking, one ought to do and it occurs when an agent makes moral judgements 
deliberately on the basis of his knowledge and critical evaluation of the context or situation15. When 
one is faced with moral questions, one tends to pause and to reason not only about what to do but 
also about what one ought to do. As argued by Sarah Chan and Harris (2011) reasoning represents 
the one factor that should pull an agent in the direction of morality. They (ibid.: 130) argue that:  
                                                
15 Moral reasoning should not be confused with reason. I am not claiming that reason is a necessary requirement for 
moral agency and moral behaviour. I am claiming that moral reasoning, understood as the practical reasoning about 
what, morally, one ought to do, is a necessary prerequisite for moral agency and moral behaviour. 
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“a moral agent is not just someone who performs actions with moral consequences, she is a person 
who cares about doing the right thing. Such a person must have a way of deciding whether what her 
emotions prompt her to do, what strikes her as the right thing to do, really is the right thing to do. 
She will need to think things through, identify the relevant principles she accepts, the values she 
holds and the moral objectives she believes are right, and apply them to the present circumstances”.  
In order to be able to do all of this, however, such an agent must use moral reasoning. 
Furthermore, according to Harris (2014: 251), the freedom to fall and individuals’ sufficiency to 
have stood are deeply related: “the sufficiency to have stood is man’s ability to explain and justify 
his choices in terms that fully account for and explain his actions”. The ability to reason, deliberate 
and reflect comes not only from the opportunity but also from the imperative to act and behave on 
the results of this reasoning, deliberative and reflecting process (Harris, 2016).  
By contrast, the idea underlying moral bioenhancement concerns the possibility to making 
people morally better directly, that is by pharmaceutical or other biomedical manipulation. As 
Consuelo Louverà (2016) points out, Douglas (2008), for instance, maintains that to act morally, 
means to bring about the desirable outcome and he has argued that an act should be judged as moral 
or immoral merely in terms of its outcomes and that the morality of an act should be clearly 
distinguished from the process that has brought about the action itself. In other words, behaviour-
oriented interventions do not necessarily involve moral reflection but only a modification of the 
behaviour. Behaviour-oriented interventions of biomedical moral enhancement fail to take into 
consideration the important role that reasoning plays in morality and ethics and to distinguish 
proper moral enhancement from morally desirable outcomes. Advocates of behaviour-oriented 
interventions maintain that the direct alteration of individuals’ biological, genetic and psychological 
traits, emotions and dispositions, would make individuals morally better. However, as I have 
argued, to act in order to bring about the most desirable outcome does not necessarily have to 
overlap with an improvement of moral abilities. Moral behaviour is more than behaviour that leads 
to morally desirable outcomes. As Harris (2013a: 288) argues, what distinguish moral behaviour 
from non-moral behaviour is that the latter “involve[s], almost always, a combination of evidence 
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and argument and where this combination becomes disjoint, they, at the very least, involve 
judgement”. The reason for this is that moral dilemmas present us with a choice. As Harris argues, 
moral dilemmas present us with: “a parting of the ways at a junction” (ibid.). Moral reasoning is 
what enables us to travel one road, i.e. to behave morally, and not another, i.e. to behave immorally, 
and to arrive at a moral judgement. I personally think that moral enhancement should be understood 
as an enhancement that leads to better moral decision-making rather than to better outcomes or 
results. 
Some commentators (Harris, 2011; Agar, 2014; Simkulet, 2012) argue that those types of 
modification of moral behaviour, that do not involve a change in moral reflection, should be 
considered as forms of behaviour control rather than as actual moral enhancement. I personally 
agree with the commentators because I think that acting morally as a result of biomedical 
manipulation is not the same as acting morally as a consequence of thinking ethically. Behaviour-
oriented interventions which by-pass individuals’ reflection processes consider moral behaviour as 
a kind of automatic behaviour which, as such, does not necessarily require the active control of the 
subject. This is because, as Harris (2014) argues, behaviour-oriented interventions make the subject 
less able to choose rationally and weigh alternatives from a moral perspective. As such, Harris 
(2014: 372) argues, these interventions “may produce moral behaviour, in the sense of behaviour 
that is de facto right or good all things considered, but not behaviour that is informed by moral 
judgement, which I take to be behaviour best calculated, judged by a moral agent, to have the 
effect”. Furthermore, I think it is quite absurd to assert that any intervention performed on a person 
that results in the person bringing about the desirable outcomes has morally enhanced that person. 
Consider a case in which an individual, which I am going to refer to as X, is going to kill another 
individual, which I am going to refer to as Y.  A third individual, which I am going to refer to as Z, 
might intervene by offering individual X a bribe should he refrain from killing individual Y, 
resulting in the desirable outcome of individual Y remaining alive. Suppose, further, that individual 
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X takes individual Z up on the offer and honours his agreement. As a result, individual Y remains 
alive –a good outcome is achieved-. I do not think that it would make sense to say that individual Z 
has morally enhanced individual X. Now, suppose individual Z could have obtained the same good 
outcome –saving individual Y’s life- by giving person X a drug that made thoughts of saving 
individual Y’s life appealing. Both of these two interventions lead to the same good or desirable 
outcome but they do not result in the moral enhancement of individual X. If anything, these two 
interventions make person X a less successful killer (Simkulet, 2016: 715). This is because, rather 
than improving the subject’s moral character or motivation, this intervention by-passes reasoning 
and circumvent the subject’s ability to make decisions for himself. Although these interventions 
might be acceptable in some cases, such as to prevent someone from harming himself or others. It 
does not seem that they should fall under the guise of moral enhancement. Not any improvement in 
moral behaviour represents an instance of moral enhancement. This is because, when morally 
evaluating something, one should take into account other elements despite the action’s outcomes. 
These other elements are the agent’s intentions, reasons, acknowledgement, and embracement of 
the latter as well as the fact that the agent is accountable and responsible for his actions and their 
outcomes. As Harris (2016: 36) writes: “not all behaviour and not even all behaviour that affects 
moral outcomes is moral behaviour”. One can accidentally act in the most desirable manner but 
one cannot accidentally be moral. As Harris (ibid.: 35) argues : “Being moral is like being 
scientific”. In the same way in which one cannot accidentally be moral, one cannot accidentally be 
scientific. The reason for this is that science is a deliberative and disciplined process, i.e. it involves, 
for instance, formulating and testing hypothesis and looking for disconfirmatory as well as 
confirmatory evidence. The same logic holds for moral behaviour. Moral behaviour cannot be 
reduced to behaviour that affects moral outcomes, nor to behaviour that conforms to generally 
accepted norms of morality. Moral behaviour is more than this. Moral behaviour is the result of a 
reasoning, deliberative and reflective process (ibid.: 35 – 36). With this I do not intend to deny the 
importance of outcomes or consequences in the evaluation of moral issues. My point is that 
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outcomes and consequences only represent some of the factors, i.e. they are not a sufficient 
condition for morality and moral behaviour, that should be taken into consideration when 
considering morality and evaluating moral behaviour. Those include an agent’s ability to identify, 
decide and act for the best, all things considered (ibid.). 
Behaviour-oriented interventions merely focus on the achievement of desirable outcomes and, 
when they do focus on individuals’ moral behaviour, they attempt to mechanically enhance it as if it 
was a mere matter of cause and effect. Behaviour-oriented interventions rule out moral deliberation 
and decision-making, they bypass the very process of moral agency and thus they attempt to 
determine or design individuals’ behaviour rather than to enhance it. Behaviour-oriented 
intervention might successfully increase what Douglas (2014: 79) refers to as ‘brute conformity’, 
which is exempted from moral deliberation and which works by removing some affective or 
conative obstacles to moral conformity. However, they will not successfully increase individuals’ 
deliberative conformity, which consists in moral deliberation and involves moral reasoning. The 
difference between brute and deliberative conformity resides in the fact that the latter works 
because it enhances individuals’ moral knowledge, moral understanding a moral judgement. As 
such, deliberative conformity, which might be enhanced by means of traditional methods of moral 
enhancement, such as education and socialisation, might actually enhance individuals’ morality; 
while, brute conformity, which can occur as the result of behaviour-oriented interventions, does not 
have the potential to morally enhance individuals (ibid.). In the same way in which it would be 
absurd to maintain that moral enhancement could be successfully achieved by making people 
behave so as to bring about the most desirable outcomes, it is absurd to maintain that moral 
enhancement could be successfully achieved by improving individuals’ conformity to moral 
behaviour. As Douglas (2014: 80) recognizes: “the distinction between conformity to morality and 
acting in a way that has moral worth has been a commonplace since Kant. To say that an action 
has ‘moral worth’ is, in standard philosophical usage, to say that it reflects well, morally, on the 
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agent – that the agent merits moral praise for having done that act”. The reason for this is that both 
types of interventions fail to enhance individuals’ motivation.   
Moral Behaviour and Moral Responsibility 
Moral behaviour is based on reason and, as such, it involves responsibility. To behave morally, 
implies “to take or to accept responsibility” which “means to be able to be held accountable for 
whatever decisions are taken, on the basis on the assumption that reasons can be provided, that 
they have been thought through, and even thought they might be fallible” (Van Niekerk & Nortjee’, 
2013: 28). The fact that moral behaviour necessarily implies responsibility is quite straightforward. 
Moral responsibility stems from an individual’s ability to reason and that very much depends on 
freedom “our responsibility stems from our will, from the fact that we did these things on purpose” 
(Harris, 2016: 95). It is because we are free that we are able to choose and, at the same time, 
responsible for the choices we make as well as for the consequences of our choices. A moral agent 
is assumed to be responsible for his choices and actions as far as his choices and actions are the 
result of his free will. By contrast, if a moral agent takes a decision or performs an action because 
he is forced to, he is generally not taken to be responsible for the consequences of the decision 
taken or the action performed: “responsibility is predicted on the idea that our decisions are our 
own, are expressions of our will, and not merely the products of brute forces, whether natural, 
social, or divine” (ibid.). 
Moral responsibility is deeply related to a specific kind of freedom, namely the freedom to fall 
as well as the freedom to reason and deliberate. Moral responsibility depends on the freedom to fall 
because it is only by virtue of having the freedom to fall that an individual could be held 
responsible for his decisions and action. If one is forced to make a decision or to act in a 
determinate manner, then he is not assumed to be responsible for his decision or his action. As John 
Martin Fisher (2006: 22 – 24) argues, moral responsibility necessarily requires control, i.e. to 
initiate or be the source of own one’s behaviour. An agent who is manipulated to choose and to act 
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in a determinate way, does not have control, i.e. he is not free to fall, and thus he is not morally 
responsible for his actual choices and behaviour. He is not free, even if he would have freely chosen 
to behave in the same manner were he not manipulated or forced to act in the predetermined way. 
Furthermore, moral responsibility is deeply related to the human ability to reason and deliberate. In 
is it in virtue of their freedom and their ability to reason that human beings have the ability to 
choose. However, to have a choice is to bear responsibility for that choice and its consequences: 
“We are creatures who are aware of the fact that this is what we are doing. With this power comes 
responsibility, and with the ability to reason and reflect comes the opportunity and the imperative 
to action the results of that reasoning and reflective process” (Harris, 2016: 32). It is because 
human beings are free to fall and have the abilities to reason and distinguish between good and bad 
that they are responsible for the outcomes of their actions, and to act in a morally justifiable 
manner.  
Harris (ibid.) maintains that it is by virtue of their being free and reasonable creatures that 
human beings are capable of acting morally: “We stand out as the only creatures so far identified 
who have any sense at all of decency and goodness, in short who have a morality properly so 
called”. 
Persson and Savulescu (2012a) criticize Harris’s objection and maintain that the freedom to fall 
is not necessary for moral responsibility. They (ibid.: 114) illustrate their objection with an 
example:  
“Imagine that you decide to do the morally right thing on the basis of considering reasons for and 
against, as somebody who is morally responsible is supposed to. Imagine, however, that there is a 
freaky mechanism in your brain which would have kicked in if you had been in the process of making 
not this decision, but a decision to do something which is morally wrong […] Hence you are not free 
to fall […] Would the presence of this freaky mechanism mean that you are not praiseworthy for 
making the right decision? It is hard to see why it would: after all the mechanism was never called 
into operation; it remained idle. In fact you decided to do the morally right thing for precisely the 
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same reasons as someone whose brain does not feature the freaky mechanism could do, and whose 
praiseworthiness is therefore not in doubt”.  
Person and Savulescu (ibid.) argue that the example shows that freedom of will or action is not 
indispensable for moral responsibility and thus that Harris freedom to fall is not essential for moral 
choice and action. However, the issue is not praiseworthiness, but liberty, i.e. the freedom to fall. 
Furthermore, as Harris (2014) points out, Persson and Savulesu’s example shows, at most, that the 
freedom to fall is not essential for choice, it does not show, in any case, that the freedom to fall is 
not essential for moral choice and action. The reason for this is that since moral responsibility is 
“the responsibility for the actions, the doings, and the effects that are part of our moral decision-
making process” (ibid.: 249), once the decision-making part of the process is taken out of the 
equation, there remains nothing for the agent to be responsible for. Decisions to no effect are 
pointless from a moral perspective (ibid.). Moreover, Harris maintains that the freaky mechanism 
would undermine agency itself, rather than merely preventing agents from making bad decisions. 
Persson and Savulescu (2012a) also illustrate their point with the previously discussed example 
of the God Machine. Recall that the God Machine is an omniscient machine that has access to 
people’s minds and that intervenes when individuals are about to perform an immoral action by 
changing their minds so that they do not perform it. According to Persson and Savulescu (ibid.), the 
God Machine would not affect the moral responsibility of those agents who never chose to perform 
immoral actions. They maintain that, since the God Machine would only intervene if they choose to 
perform an immoral action, human beings will still be able to autonomously choose to be moral. 
However, Harris (2014: 249) convincingly argues that the God Machine would in fact 
undermine the moral responsibility of agents who never chose to perform immoral actions. As I 
have already explained, the notion of the freedom to fall includes both the freedom of action and the 
freedom of choice. As a result, Harris (ibid.) does not understand moral responsibility only as the 
freedom to make choices. The fact that an individual is free to make choices is perhaps a necessary, 
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but not a sufficient condition for moral responsibility. As Pugh (2017: 5) points out, in order to be 
morally responsible, “those choices must be able to result in action that actually makes a difference 
to external states of affairs”. 
This seems to suggest that to threaten or curtail individuals’ freedom to fall also implies to 
threaten or curtail individuals’ moral responsibility. This in turn, suggests that, behaviour-oriented 
interventions undermine the possibility of moral behaviour. I have argued that behaviour-oriented 
interventions threaten individuals’ freedom to fall, as well as the two elements that characterise 
moral behaviour, namely reason and responsibility. As a result, behaviour-oriented interventions do, 
in fact, threaten individuals’ ability to behave morally. If an individual cannot exercise his freedom 
to fall, his actions and choices cannot be considered the result of free and autonomous decisions, 
nor can he be held responsible for his behaviour. However, a choice or an act that is not based on 
reasons and for which one cannot be held responsible, cannot be considered to have any moral 
value: “The way human beings make moral decisions requires the interaction of a complex network 
of emotional, cognitive and motivational processes that cannot be reduced just to moral emotions 
or technological control but also to practical reasoning” (Hughes, 2015: 87).  
This does not necessarily imply that human beings should not seek moral development. In fact, 
there are many very attractive forms of moral development available, that are more effective than 
behaviour-oriented interventions of moral enhancement and do not pose any threat to individuals’ 
freedom to fall, i.e. they will improve human beings’ ethical expertise without threatening their 
freedom. Education, for instance, increases people’s knowledge of the good and of how to achieve 
it, but it leaves individuals’ freedom intact: it respects their liberty to explore the space between 
knowing the good and doing the good. This is very important because, as Harris (2016: 60) argues, 
to be better at knowing the good does not necessarily implies being better at doing the good. It is 
possible to achieve moral enhancement by means of interventions that attempt to alter individuals’ 
behaviour by improving their moral capacities. Improving cognitive capacities, for instance, 
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represents a valid way of achieving adequate moral enhancement. Consider, for example, the case 
of individuals that hold racist beliefs or paedophilic desires. Harris (2016) states that, to hold racist 
beliefs is to hold false beliefs. As a result, racism cannot be resolved by interventions of biomedical 
moral enhancement. Beliefs, irrespective of truth or falseness, have cognitive content, and therefore 
they need to be adjusted through cognitive measures. As Harris writes: “the neutralization of the 
worst effects of racist beliefs is enhanced by cognitive enhancement” (ibid.: 62). Harris maintains 
that this is clearly shown by the fact that, in the last hundred years, racism has been dramatically 
reduced by traditional and cognitive methods of moral enhancement such as education, public 
disapproval and knowledge acquisition (ibid.). 
Critique 
Harris’ argument has given rise to several objections. The most interesting and persuasive one is 
that it is not clear that the freedom to fall is sufficiently valuable for Harris’ purposes. In most 
cases, human beings have strong moral reasons to prevent their fellow beings from carrying out 
selfish and extremely violent act. Overall it would not be a great loss to take away individuals’ 
freedom to carry out such acts (DeGrazia, 2014: 365; Persson and Savulescu, 2012a; Douglas, 
2013; Bublitz, 2016). However, it is important to distinguish between individuals’ freedom to 
immorality and individuals’ ability to act morally. Harris’ is critical of behaviour-oriented 
interventions because they limit and undermine individuals’ ability to act morally and not only 
because they undermine individuals’ freedom to immorality. Traditional methods of moral 
enhancement, such as education, also limit individuals’ freedom to immorality. However, in doing 
so, they do not also pose a threat to individuals’ ability to act morally. This is because, traditional 
methods of moral enhancement are not based on the bypassing of moral reasoning, judgement and 
deliberation. 
Harris (2014: 257) maintains that the value of liberty should take precedence despite these 
concerns. This is because, as I argued in the above, the freedom to fall is a necessary prerequisite 
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for moral agency. In addition, exercising the freedom to fall in what enables individuals to take 
decisions and to constitute themselves as selves, as individuals, as human beings. 
Closing Remarks 
Not many people doubt that there is much room for human beings’ to morally improve. In the 
previous chapters I have therefore discussed the acceptability of behaviour-oriented interventions as 
ways to biomedically enhance human morality.  
The aim of this chapter was to find an answer to the following questions: Will morally bio-
enhanced individuals be morally better because they have been programmed or determined to be 
so? And, if this is the case, how can a true moral disposition, which seemingly inevitably involves 
the agent’s freedom to choose, be reconciled with the social determinism that seems to inevitably 
follow from interventions of biomedical moral enhancement? Can true freedom survive a practice 
where people may make choices that ensure less suffering (for humans, animals and plants) on 
earth, but have or remain with little choice in the matter? Is human freedom not fundamentally 
compromised by any effort to pre-determine the choices that people can make? In short, what 
happens to the nature and practice of morality in a situation where moral choice – which seemingly 
inevitably involves the possibility of making “wrong” choices (i.e. choices that may continue to 
have negative effects on the issues mentioned earlier) – is either terminated or significantly 
curtailed? 
I have argued that behaviour-oriented interventions could make people behave in ways that will 
most probably be more beneficial to others and to the planet. However, if we would opt for such 
interventions in our moral make-up, we would curtail individuals’ freedom, undermine the very 
essence of morality and diminish our moral agency. Enhanced people will perform some pre-
determined set of actions, and acting in such a way would not indicate any particular 
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praiseworthiness on the part of people carrying them out. The moral capacities of ‘enhanced’ people 
will in fact not be enhanced at all, i.e. there will not be any improvement in morality.  
Furthermore, advocates of behaviour-oriented interventions maintain that the enhancement of 
some pro-social or allegedly morally desirable traits and emotions will lead to moral enhancement. 
However, as I have argued, these interventions might, at best, increase the probability that 
individuals act in ways that bring about morally desirable outcomes, but will not morally enhance 
individuals: “Moral enhancement does not make nor even attempt to make people better; it may if it 
is lucky make people more likely to avoid aggressive behaviour but luck might just as easily go the 
wrong way as far as morality properly so called, is concerned” (Harris, 2016: 78).  
Moral enhancement should not be reduced to policies of harm reduction. A decrease in 
behaviour that causes harm to others or to the planet may look, at first sight, as though it makes the 
world a better place. However, it is very unlikely to change people’s moral outlook or judgement, 
“although what happens certainly changes what people are able to do, or more modestly, what 
people are likely to do” (ibid.: 83). Moral enhancement should involve enhancing individuals’ 
ability to think ethically, not manipulating the probability of some people reacting in ways that are 
generally accepted as ethical (ibid.: 82 - 85).  
At this point a question might arise. If the outcome is the same, why is the one (thinking 
ethically, being able to judge and choose the right thing to do) preferred over the other (acting as to 
bring about the most morally desirable outcome) ? The reason for this is that, while thinking 
ethically, being able to judge and choose the right thing to do, are conductive to moral behaviour, 
the mere fact of acting as to bring about the most morally desirable outcome – when separated from 
the reasonable, autonomous, free and responsible process of thinking, judging and choosing that 
characterises moral thinking and moral performance – does not have any moral value. 
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I do recognize that behaviour-oriented interventions might lead to individuals acting so as to 
bring about the most morally desirable outcome more often than other traditional methods of 
enhancement, such as education, which attempt to indirectly influence individuals’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, I do recognize that we are currently facing issues, such as global poverty and 
environmental catastrophes, that urgently require to be addressed. However, when talking about 
morality, outcomes and results are not all that counts. When considering and evaluating the value of 
a moral choice or act, one cannot only take into consideration the effects that such choice or act 
implies. Individuals’ freedom, including their very freedom to fall, and thus their ability to 
deliberately choose to act immorally, is an important pre-requisite for moral agency. The reason for 
this, is that, irrespectively of its outcome, a choice, a decision or a behaviour can only be defined as 
morally valuable if they are the result of individuals’ free choice. In conclusion, although 
enhancements that leave intact individuals’ freedom to fall might lead to individuals act so as to 
bring about the most morally desirable outcomes less often than behaviour-oriented interventions, 
they should be preferred because they make morality possible. 
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Conclusion 
Human enhancement is, as old as human civilisation. Individuals have been trying to overcome 
their limitations, to improve and enhance themselves, their life style and their environment since the 
beginning of human history. This effort for improvement has led to the successful improvement of 
several of human beings’ physical, mental, emotional and moral capabilities.  
Recent scientific developments in areas such as biotechnology and biomedicine have led to a 
revolution in the field of biomedical enhancement and to the emergence of innovative and 
revolutionary possibilities of human enhancement. Biomedical scientists have been able to discover 
ways in which human beings could not only be enhanced in terms of their physiological make up, 
but also with regard to their moral convictions and inclinations. Several advocates of this new 
possibility, referred to as biomedical moral enhancement (or moral bio-enhancement), have 
maintained that biomedical moral enhancement could alter the current generally irresponsible and 
self-centred practices of people throughout the world today, create a sustainable future for 
forthcoming generations and the planet and make people morally better. Some supporters, such as 
Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, have even argued that moral bioenhancement represents an 
urgent necessity and the only hope that human beings have if they wish to avoid major catastrophes, 
including the destruction of the planet and of their own species.  
 However, biomedical moral enhancement, at the same time, tinkers with the very essence of 
human beings. Those innovative practices raise important issues of liberty and responsibility and 
pose serious questions that need to be critically considered and evaluated before one accepts the 
case for interventions of biomedical moral enhancement.  I decided to focus my attention and my 
study on the one problem that I think is one of the most important ones. This is the relation between 
interventions of biomedical moral enhancement, individuals’ freedom and morality. More 
specifically, my study was driven by two questions: 1. Would interventions of moral enhancement 
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curtail or inhibit individuals’ freedom? 2. If they would, what will such a curtailment imply for the 
practice of morality?  
In the first part of the thesis I have analysed the notion of biomedical moral enhancement and I 
have looked at some of the conceptual and theoretical problems surrounding the practice – such as 
the problem of the identification of the possible criteria for the evaluation of those interventions – 
as well as some of the arguments that have been developed in support of interventions of moral bio-
enhancement. Then, using Harris’ objection as a starting point for my study, I have explored 
whether interventions of moral enhancement might actually lead to the curtailment of individuals’ 
freedom. I have argued that a specific type of intervention, namely behaviour-oriented 
interventions, do pose a threat to individuals’ freedom to fall, i.e. to deliberately, autonomously, 
reasonably, responsibly and freely choose to act immorally. I have defined moral behaviour as a 
type of behaviour that results from an individual’s free, deliberative, autonomous, reasonable and 
responsible decision to act in a specific way and I have argued that those behaviour-oriented 
interventions do not only curtail individuals’ freedom to fall but also bypass and inhibit individuals’ 
reasoning and responsibility. In the light of this, I have concluded that, although those types of 
intervention might successfully lead individuals to act so as to bring about the most morally 
desirable outcome, they would fail to make people morally better, i.e. to morally enhance them, and 
that they would actually make moral practice worthless and meaningless, i.e. they would severely 
affect individuals’ ability to engage in proper moral behaviour and reduce morality to moral 
compulsion or moral conformity. 
The reason for this is that, as I have argued, any behaviour that does not occur as the result of an 
individual’s free, autonomous reasonable and responsible choice, irrespectively of its consequences, 
cannot be considered to have any moral value.  
It is important to note that the major problem is not that behaviour-oriented interventions reduce 
individuals’ choices by making it impossible for them to behave immorally. The problem is rather 
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that in order to be able to behave morally, one necessarily needs to be able to choose to behave 
immorally. The possibility of moral behaviour requires the possibility of choosing whether to act 
morally or not. If a person does not choose how to behave, i.e. acts out of compulsion or 
conformity, and thus does not freely choose how to behave, the person does not engage in moral 
behaviour, i.e. his behaviour and his choices are not grounded in freedom, autonomy, reasonability 
or responsibility and, as such, they cannot have any moral value. 
Advocates of behaviour-oriented interventions maintain that moral enhancement could be 
achieved by making people behave so as to bring about the most desirable outcomes. However, 
consequences are not all that count. To behave morally involves more than behaving in order to 
bring about the most desirable outcome. To behave morally also, and most importantly, involves the 
ability to act for the best, all things considered. Behaviour-oriented interventions bypass reasoning 
and the ability to consider all the relevant things. As such, they might increase the possibility that 
individuals would act in order to bring about the most desirable outcomes, but not that they will 
behave for the best all things considered; i.e. behave morally.  
This does not have to imply that human beings should not seek moral improvement. Human 
individuals are far from morally perfect. However, as I have argued, other types of enhancement, 
(such as cognitive enhancement) are as yet available that could and would make people morally 
better without curtailing their freedom to fall or inhibiting their ability to behave morally. By 
contrast to advocates of behaviour-oriented interventions of moral enhancement, I do not think that 
more traditional methods of moral enhancement would be less effective than more innovative ones. 
However, I do think that they should be supported by governments and social policies and 
institutions. The reason for this that governments, institutions and infrastructures could better 
address some of the moral issues that we are currently facing, such as global poverty and inequality 
as well as environmental catastrophes, then relying on individuals’ efforts to act for the best, all 
things considered. As Harris (2016: 156) argues: 
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“Health, welfare and national defence are unlikely to be effectively deliverable in modern societies 
by individual actions and private initiatives. So that levels of altruism that are beyond the power of 
individuals may be effectively deliverable by governments or other social institutions. No individual 
can usually hope to ‘feed the poor’, defend the weak or ‘heal the sick’, but good social welfare and 
health services and infrastructures (whether publicly or privately funded) can and do, so far as this is 
possible at all”. 
Advocates of behaviour-oriented interventions, such as Persson and Savulescu, as well as 
Douglas, maintain that most of the challenging issues that we are currently facing are the result of 
individuals’ moral deficiencies and tendencies to neglect their moral obligations and responsibility 
and that individuals’ moral bioenhancement represents the only hope to address and cope with those 
issues. I do believe that individuals’ moral deficiencies and their tendency to neglect their moral 
obligations and responsibilities in fact pose serious problems. However, I do not think that 
individuals’ moral enhancement, by itself, represents the most appropriate solution to the issues that 
we are currently facing. I think that individuals’ obligations and responsibilities would more 
effectively delivered by collective rather than individual action. 
Secondly, but not less importantly, advocates of behaviour-oriented interventions maintain that, 
in order to make people morally better, we should enhance some traits and dispositions that are pro-
social, such as altruism, and inhibit or eliminate some others, such as violence and aggressiveness. 
This idea is based on two assumptions. The first is that attitudes and traits can be divided into two 
categories: those which lead to moral and social behaviour, and those who lead to immoral and anti-
social behaviour. The second assumption is that to be pro-social, means to be moral. However, as 
Peter Strawson (1960) argues, in some cases, the sort of traits and dispositions that seem to lead to 
immorality, i.e. violence, aggressiveness, are also the very same required for virtue and morality. In 
other words, certain strong emotions, including aversions, are an essential and even desirable part of 
valuable emotions, motives or attitudes to others. Consider the following example. To feel a strong 
aversion to someone who deliberately and unjustifiably killed and tortured those whom we love, 
does not represent an obstacle to moral behaviour or a moral deficiency. In addition, the 
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enhancement of the so called pro-social attitudes and emotions would most probably fail to lead to 
individuals’ moral enhancement if not complemented with individuals’ ability to reason, deliberate 
and reflect. The reason for this is that, although it might be possible to identify traits, attitudes and 
emotions that are more conducive to moral behaviour than others (such as altruism and empathy), 
moral reasoning would nevertheless play a central role. Moral reasoning is, in fact, needed in order 
to identify the appropriate objects for those attitudes, dispositions and emotions that are generally 
assumed to be more conducive to moral behaviour than others. Moral reasoning plays a central role 
because it enables individuals to guide their emotions and to check that they have the appropriate 
feelings in the appropriate circumstances for the appropriate objects. 
Furthermore, human history is full of instances in which the upholding of what was regarded as 
moral behaviour, has, in the end, led to immoral actions. Consider, for instance, slavery, racism or 
the exclusion of women from most areas of public and political life. In order to avoid the possibility 
of repeating the same mistakes, we should refrain from interventions that bypass individuals’ ability 
to reason, reflect and, most importantly revise and review positions.  The reason for this is that, 
although as human beings, we are fallible, our ability to reason, reflect and revise our ideas and 
positions, enable us to see and correct our mistakes. 
In conclusion, I think that behaviour-oriented interventions would not only fail to make people 
morally better, but also make moral agency impossible. The freedom to fall is what makes us able 
to behave morally and what distinguishes us from other beings. Although the curtailment of such 
freedom might lead to a more favourable climate for the environment and other people, I really do 
not think that the benefits of such interventions would out-weigh their costs. We will lose a part of 
us, we will lose what makes us what we are. The potential threat posed by behaviour-oriented 
interventions goes far beyond the curtailment of individuals’ freedom to fall and their ability to 
behave morally. Behaviour-oriented interventions would affect our sense of who and what we are 
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and of the extent to which we are, or can remain, masters of our fate - entities which create 
ourselves by our decisions and actions.  
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